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I
prepared these lectures we were acutely aware that our timing

was a little off. However we put our points, it would appear that
we were speaking almost a hundred years too late on behalf of our
views. We uneasily anticipate the compliment that in these lectures we
will be showing ourselves to have two of the best minds of the 19th Century. Nor have we forgotten that the Yale Law School is our host and
that Yale students and friends are our audience: We are confident that
there is no group in America to whom the views we are about to express
will prove so little congenial.'
In a general way we intend to discuss automobile accident compensation plans, but the center of our interest is somewhat different from that
of others who have written on the subject.2 We are not responding dit Professors of Law, The University of Chicago.
1 The substance of this essay was presented as the Shulman Lectures at the Yale
Law School, February 11, 12, 13, 1964, delivered jointly, although not quite simultaneously, by the authors.
Since the lectures were given, with this title, our attention has been called to an
article by Dean Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 257
(1960). It appears, however, that he was using the term "public law" in a somewhat
different sense. And in any event see Kalven, Book Review, 26 U. CHL L. Rv. 679
(1959) (of GREEN, TRAFFIC VIcrIs: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958)).

2 After this essay was written but prior to its publication, we had the benefit of
reading a draft of KFETON & O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECrION FOR TRAFFIC VIcr us

(Proposed Draft Dec. 1963). It is an impressive and important contribution to the
literature on the topic.
Although both essays are on the same subject, the center of interest is quite different. Keeton and O'Connell have been chiefly interested in developing and defending a specific legislative proposal; we have been interested in the analytic framework
for examining any type of auto compensation plan. There are certain points of tension
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rectly to the practical problem of coping with carnage on the highways;
nor are we concerned with the merits of any particular compensation
plan. Instead our interest lies in exploring the underlying rationale of
tort liability and compensation schemes, and we look upon auto accidents
as providing both an active and a finite area for testing liability and
compensation theories. Our concern therefore is with policy.
Speaking loosely, the main question is usually taken to involve a single
choice between the common law system in which not all victims recover,
and inevitably there is delay in paying claims, and an auto compensation
plan under which every victim would get something, including prompt
payment of medical and emergency expenses. 3 This is too stark a contrast
because of possible variations both on the common law side and among
auto compensation plans. Thus if we add to the common law both compulsory liability insurance and comparative negligence-neither of which
can now be considered a radical change-we end up with a negligence
system under which the vast majority of victims recover something, albeit
not promptly. And similarly if we postulate a compensation plan which
embodies a low ceiling on damages, we would have a scheme under which
victims as a class bear a large part of the losses. Moreover, most of the
plans which have been offered resemble the common law to the extent
that all losses are thought of as being borne only by motorists and victims
of accidents. If we were to conceive of the special combination of tort law
and social insurance of the English variety as constituting a plan, it differs both from the common law and from other plans in that the public
at large, through tax funds, bears part of the losses. But enough has been
said to indicate why our subject cannot quickly be reduced to a simple
policy choice.
The idea of a plan for auto accidents has been conspicuous for almost
between the two presentations, but we have decided it would not be feasible to
attempt to deal with them at this time. Therefore we have allowed our manuscript
to stand as it was.
There has been voluminous writing on the auto compensation plan theme generally.
A reasonably complete bibliography is collected in GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES ON TORTS
xliv-lii, 689-787 (1959).
Since 1959 there have been several articles that deserve special mention: Adams,
Law, Insurance and the Automobile Accident Victim, 29 J. INs. 523 (1962); Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961);
James, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An Unanswered Challenge, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 408 (1959); McCrae, Legal Aspects of Automobile Compensation, 29 J. INs. 185 (1962); C. Robert Morris, Jr., Enterprise Liability
and the Actuarial Process-the Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961);
Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
913 (1962).
a Even this generalization does not hold for all varieties of plans. Thus, for example, the "major medical" model, discussed section 6 infra, would not result in all
auto victims receiving something.
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half a century, with the obvious analogy to workmen's compensation having suggested itself early. The history of such proposals has been somewhat checkered, and may be quickly surveyed under three names-Ballantine, Columbia and Green.
The classic expression of the early enthusiasm is found in the 1916
Ballantine article, 4 albeit he was concerned with reforming the common
law handling of railroad accidents, not auto accidents. His principal
thesis was that "an altogether simpler method is available for the adjustment of ...claims-a method based upon the ideas which have in recent
years found beneficent expression in the workmen's compensation acts." 5
The Columbia auto plan of 1932,6 although still showing the impress
of workmen's compensation, seems in retrospect to have been the offspring of two currents of thought-the emergence of realist jurisprudence
and the reform enthusiasm which crystallized in the New Deal. The distinctive pitch of the Columbia plan was to launch large-scale empirical
research into law in action and to sidestep the basic policy issues. The
strategy was to overwhelm with a great array of hard facts which seemed
to carry their own conclusions. But although the study immediately
ranked as one of the great events in law, it soon disappeared from view,
and this despite the fact that auto accidents continued to mount. Thereafter for almost two decades a period of curious inactivity set in, during
which a whole generation of law school graduates probably never even
heard about the Columbia report, and surely never read it.7
Today and for the past several years a revival of interest has been evident. The many distinguished workers in this field, including Fleming
4 Ballentine, A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims, 29 HAsv. L. REv.
705 (1916). Other examples of early approaches are Carman, Is a Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation Act Advisable? 4 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1919); Rollins, A Proposal to
Extend the Compensation Principle to Accidents in the Streets, MAss. L.Q. No. 5, p.

392 (1919).
5 Ballantine, supra note 4, at 707.
6 REPORT

OF

CoasssrrrEE

To

STUDY
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FOR

AUTOMOBILE

AccIDENTS

(1932). See also FRENcH, TRE AUTOMOBILE COMPENSATION PLAN
(1933); Smith, Lilly & Dowling, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium,
32 COLUM. L. REv. 785 (1932).
(COLuMBIA REPORTS)

7 A notable exception is James & Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims:
A Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CONN. B.J. 70 (1952) (a restudy of the experience in New Haven twenty years after the Columbia Plan); see the two careful studies
by John F. Adams: A Survey of the Economic-Financial Consequences of Personal
Injuries Resulting from Automobile Accidents in the City of Philadelphia, 1953,
Temple University Economics and Business Bulletin, March 1955; and A Comparative
Analysis of Costs of Insuring Against Losses Due to Automobile Accidents: Various
Hypotheses-New Jersey, 1955, Temple University Economics and Business Bulletin,
March 1960.
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James, s Albert Ehrenzweig, 9 Robert Keeton, 10 Clarence Morris" and Alfred Conard, 2 will not take it amiss if we select the publication in 1958
of Leon Green's lectures on "Traffic Victims" as epitomizing the revival.' 3
The striking thing about the lectures is not that Dean Green proposed
an auto plan but that, after a long and brilliant career as a scholar in
tort law, he argued strongly for jettisoning the whole traditional common law apparatus in favor of a simple compensation scheme.' 4 Response
to his proposal has made it dear that he was expressing the predominant
attitude of the interested academic community.
The topic today is as lively as it ever has been. 15 Several factors may
account for its re-emergence. The contemporary mood is again congenial
to sociological research in law. It has seemed attractive to many to redo
the Columbia study because the auto accident problem is a natural subject for large scale empirical research on which newly developed tools can
8 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS, chs. XI-XIII (1956); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); James, supra
note 2; James & Law, supra note 7.
9 EHrmZwEIG, "FULL Am" INSURANCE (1954); Ehrenzweig, Towards an Automobile
Compensation Plan, FEDERATION OF INSURANCE COUNSEL QUARTERLY, No. 3, p. 5 (1961).
10 Op. cit. supra note 2.
11 Morris, The Insurance Principle: Compulsory Insurance, in CONFERENCE ON INSURANCE (University of Chicago Law School Conference Series No. 14, 1954); Morris,
Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952); Morris
& Paul, .The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913 (1962).
12 As this essay goes to press, Alfred Conard is completing a major study of auto
accidents in Michigan, done jointly with the Michigan Survey Research Center.
CONARD & MORGAN, THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY LITIGATION.

No list of commentators on auto plans would be complete without reference to Judge
Robert Marx of Cincinnati who has been an indefatigable advocate for the reform
for a quarter of a century. E.g., Marx, Compensation Insurance for Automobile
Accident Victims: The Case for Compulsory Automobile Compensation Insurance,
15 OHIO ST. L.J. 134 (1954). See GRAUBART, YESTERDAY'S LAwS AND TODAY'S AccmENTs
(1963).
IS GREEN, TRAFFIC VICtIMs: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958); see Kalven, Book
Review, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 679 (1959).
14 The first sentence of Dean Green's essay sets the tone: "This monograph seeks to
demonstrate the obsolescence and futility of common law jury trial and liability insurance as a remedy for traffic casualties and advocates compulsory comprehensive loss
insurance as a substitute." GREEN, op. cit. supra note 13, at 5. By way of conclusion,
the author states: "The courts are powerless to reconstruct a rational process for general
use. They have reached a dead end. As a means of giving adequate protection against
the machines of the highway, negligence law has run its course. Something better
must be found." Id. at 82.
15 Within the past five years, the Governor of California has appointed a special
commission to study auto plans. Dean Green and the team of Keeton and O'Connell
have each formulated major legislative proposals; see notes 2 and 13 supra. Conard
has made a major study of the existing processing of auto accident claims. See note 12
supra. And the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute has marked the area for major
support. WALTER E. MEYER RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF LAw ANNUAL REP. 17-18 (1960-1962).
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be brought into play. In addition there is the enormous increase in insurance coverage for auto accidents. The ubiquity of insurance has sharpened the perception of the inefficiencies, costs and inequities of the present system for determining liability, measuring damages, and adjusting
claims in or out of court. Another factor is the increased sensitivity to
welfare. Concern has centered on the inability of the system to provide
victims with prompt payment of their medical and emergency expenses.
Finally, there has been the practical stimulus of urban court congestion
which frequently has been blamed on auto accident cases crowding the
dockets.10 More than one seasoned trial judge has argued that an auto
compensation plan under an administrative agency would be the best
7
solution to court delay.'
Despite the renewed interest, current discussions of auto plans are
largely unsatisfying. They lack any sustained confrontation of issues. The
bar, although it might be expected to play the role of the experienced
conservative and thus to supply a sharp challenge to the reform, has been
bluntly hostile when not apathetic. At most an occasional spokesman has
sallied forth in the journals to stigmatize the plans as socialistic departures from the American way of life.' 8 And even if the response had been
different, many would view with skepticism any defense of the current
system by the lawyers because of the bar's great financial stake in its
preservation. At the other extreme, proponents of auto plans, largely
from academic life, have concentrated on social engineering to produce
results they have already accepted as desirable. They appear so convinced
that auto plans are the coming thing that they see no point in debating
the merits of inevitable social change. Thus, although an appreciable
amount has been written about plans, very little has centered on the
kinds of policy issues which are to be our primary concern.
Indeed the special flavor of our policy concerns is the source of our
collaboration in these lectures. A bedrock question for us is the oldfashioned inquiry, who is to pay the bill? Payments to victims under
compensation plans are compulsory payments under the coercion of the
state, and obviously someone in the society must bear the cost. Allocating
the cost of plans raises a fundamental issue of fairness. It strikes us as
odd that this issue should figure so little in current discussions. The incidence of liability has been the classic question for the common law
16

ZEISEL, KALVEN

& BUCHHOLZ,

DELAY IN THE COURT

(1959).

Compare Hofstadter, Alternative Proposal to the Compensation Plan, 1956
INs. L.J. 331; Hofstadter, A Proposed Automobile Accident Compensation Plan, 328
17

ANNALS 53 (March 1960).
18 Ryan & Greene, Pedestrianism:A Strange Philosophy, 42 A.B.A.J. 117 (1956); for a

titular rejoinder, see Marx, "Motorism", Not "Pedestrianism": Compensation for the
Automobile's Victims, 42 A.B.A.J. 421 (1956).
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torts man; and yet the allocation of costs is simply another name for the
allocation of liability. The oddity is that the common law torts man
should lose all interest in the question when a shift is made from the
common law to a compensation plan. We suspect we know the reason.
Torts has been regarded as a private law topic concerned with resolving
the disputes between particular individuals. But when one turns to insurance funds and compensation plans, the matter becomes alchemized
into public law dealing with large groups in the society; and the result
is that the private law expert has little interest in following through the
questions which now seem to lie beyond the realm of his own special
competence. Nor in their present stage of development have auto compensation plans engaged the attention of public law men, who have continued to center their interest on taxation and social security and other
welfare systems. The topic has therefore fallen into a kind of no-man's
land.
The design for our collaboration should now be clear. We hope to
combine the perspectives 6f the teacher of private law and the teacher
of public law on a topic that seems to need the attention and skills of
both.
2
Anyone who wishes seriously to weigh the merits of an auto compensation plan is confronted with a peculiar difficulty: There is a tendency
for the proponents to short-circuit the argument so that the question on
the merits need never be reached. In brief, the difficulty is to get to a
place where we can start an argument.
We begin therefore with trying to salvage the issues we wish to discuss.
This requires that we meet two kinds of arguments which lead to the
conclusion that no policy issue remains. One is that in the modern world
fault has become so anachronistic and unworkable a criterion for liability
that the common law system for handling auto accidents cannot be preferred to any half-way reasonable alternative. The other is that over time
and for a variety of reasons our common law system has become so nearly
equivalent to a compensation plan that there is nothing left to argue
about.
We turn first to consider fault as a criterion of liability. We do so with
only the most modest of expectations. The whole concept of fault, even
in our torts system, is so closely tied to views on personal responsibilityand hence to values that have deep cultural and religious roots-that we
must limit our discussion of it here to very narrow confines. We have no
intention of developing an adequate brief on its behalf. Our purpose is
merely to counteract the fashionable tendency to dismiss it out of hand
as being an untenable principle.
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There have been various objections to fault as a criterion for liability,
but in oversimplified fashion they can be schematized as three general
points:' 9 (1) We can never get enough facts about a particular accident
to know whether fault was present or not; (2) even if we had a full history of the event we would be unable to rationally apply the fault criterion because it is unintelligible; and (3) even if we knew the history
of the event and understood what fault meant, we would be deciding
cases on the basis of an unsound and arbitrary criterion.
The objection based on the difficulties of proof is a familiar one in all
litigation, but it is urged as presenting special and decisive difficulties for
the auto accident. There is the threat of evidence deteriorating because of
the time it may take to get to trial. There is the sheer absence of competent witnesses at the crucial time of the event. And there is the emphasis under the fault criterion on split-second time sequences which
place extra burdens on the capacity of witnesses to perceive, recall, and
narrate. 20 These difficulties cumulate, we are told, so that the actual
trial almost necessarily involves an imperfect and ambiguous historical
reconstruction of the event, making a mockery of the effort to apply so
subtle a normative criterion to the conduct involved. An impenetrable
evidentiary screen thus makes fault unworkable as a criterion whatever
its merits as a concept.
But does not this objection run the risk of proving too much? All adjudication is vulnerable to the inadequacies of evidence and the consequent exploitation of the situation by the skill of counsel. From prosecutions for murder to adjudications of the validity of family partnerships
for income tax purposes, the law has had to wrestle with these difficulties. Auto accidents are at least more public than many other legal situations and they almost invariably do leave physical traces. The witness
to an auto accident is asked for observation8 likely to be well within his
daily experience. The law can tolerate a goodly margin of error, and the
threshold of distortion which this line of attack on liability for fault must
establish before it becomes a persuasive reason for throwing over the system is high. We remain skeptical that the evidentiary aspects of the auto
19 EHRENZWEIG,

"FULL

Am"

INSURANCE

(1954);

EHRENzwEIG,

NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT

FAULT (1951); GREEN, TRAFFIC VIcTIMs: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958); 2 HARPER

& JAMEs, TORTS ch. XII (1956); Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw.
U.L. REv. 855 (1953); Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U.L. RFv. 564 (1952);
McNiece & Thornton, Is the Law of Negligence Obsolete? 26 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 255
(1952). As a counter tendency, see DeParcq, In Defense of the Fault Principle, 43 MNN.
L. REv. 499 (1959).
20 To take just one example, see Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Cal. 2d 107, 237 P.2d
977 (1951) (a last clear chance case in which the critical time intervals is a few
seconds).
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accident are so peculiar as to be set apart from the evidentiary aspects
of all other controversies that are brought to law.
The objections to fault as being an unintelligible concept also run the
risk of proving too much. One needs a generous view of the meaning of
a legal principle. We should be at least as charitable toward negligence
as we are toward procedural due process, fraud, or gross income. All the
big ideas of law are imprecise and have a core meaning which moves
toward ambiguity at the margin. Except intuitively, there seems no way
of measuring the relative clarity of such ideas. When we place negligence
in the context of law's other big ideas, it looks at home. A simple test
of its intelligibility is whether we can put easy cases so as to compel virtually complete agreement on the presence or absence of fault. We would
all readily recognize that the negligence concept could pass this test were
it not for the fact that our impressions of it are derived so much from
the reading of appellate decisions with their marginal fact situations.
The negligence concept, after all, has been employed by generations of
lawyers and judges as though it made sense. They were able to argue in
terms of it and to array cases inside and outside the line. The decades
of apparently rational discussion at the bar are paralleled by the decades
of law school teaching. Every law student has been exposed to the experience of locating the relevant variables involved and of ranking the
cases through varying a fact in one direction or the other.21
But the critic can rightly say that law students do not decide cases,
while juries do. The negligence concept is too vague, asserts the critic, to
guide the judgment of juries. The result is that juries allocate liability on
the basis of all kinds of legally irrelevant but humanly sympathetic
grounds, and that the legal criterion in fact evaporates at the level of
actual jury behavior. 22
21 Let us, as an illustration, take the well-known opinion of Learned Hand in
Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940), an auto accident case. The defendant,
approaching a covered bridge in Vermont, for convenience took a wide turn into the
bridge so that he entered in the wrong lane and collided with an oncoming car. The
plaintiff was a guest passenger injured in the collision. The defendant was familiar
with the region and the prevailing low frequency of traffic; it was a local practice to
make a wide turn into the bridge. Judge Hand decided that although defendant's
conduct was negligent, it was not grossly negligent, as would have been required for
recovery under the appropriate rule of liability to an auto guest.
On these facts, the urbane and ironic Hand was able to write an intelligible opinion.
He was able to say, and we are able to follow him, that the defendant's conduct was
neither without fault nor grossly negligent. Further, we can easily vary the facts and
thereby alter our judgment. Had 'the defendant blown his horn and reduced his speed,
we might well find no flaw in his conduct; while if he had made precisely the same
turn on a high mountain road we probably would all agree he was grossly negligent.
22 The recently compiled standard jury instructions for Illinois make explicit the
full delegation of the negligence issue to the jury. "The law does not say how a
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Normally on a point such as this there is little evidence other than
lawyer anecdotes. However, in this instance the University of Chicago
Law School Jury Project does have some directly relevant data.23 In an
extensive survey of the way judge and jury would decide the same personal injury case, the project found that in 80% of all cases the judge and
jury agreed on liability or no liability. In 10% of the cases the jury found
for the plaintiff where the judge would have found for the defendant.
And, surprisingly, in the remaining 10% of the cases the judge would
have found for the plaintiff where the jury found for the defendant. In
brief, the jury would have found for the plaintiff in precisely the same
number of cases as the judge. 24 The upshot seems to be that whatever
hidden rules the jury is in fact following when it operates under the
negligence formula, its rules must be very similar to those governing the
judge. It is thus difficult to make any special argument about the failure
of the negligence criterion to control the jury.
This, however, does not dispose of the issue completely since the critic
may now press his final objection to the intelligibility of the fault principle-the difficulty of controlling even the behavior of judges by so expansible a standard as negligence. In fact he may well say that our Jury
Project evidence confirms his worst fears that fault is inherently a quixotic criterion, that is infinitely expansible and is constantly changing its
meaning. He will tell us that what is now regarded as negligence would
have astonished judges and juries of a century ago. The challenge is that
within established and apparently unchanging doctrine, the concept of
negligence has greatly expanded its boundaries and will continue to do so.
The difficulty with this line of objection is that it presupposes that
where a jury instructed under negligence has found negligence and the
judge concurs, there is available the judgment of some third party bystander who fails to find negligence and who over time would increasingly be in disagreement with the official results. Without this ideal byreasonably careful person would act under the circumstances. That is for you to
decide." ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONs--CIvIL. No. 10.01 (1961).
23 The results of this study are in the process of being written up for publication
in book form under the title THE JURY, THE JUDGE AND THE TORT CASE.
A companion study of criminal cases is now at the publishers, ZEISEL & KALvs,
THE JURY, THE JUDGE AND THE CIMINAL CASE.
For indications of other aspects of the jury project, see ZEISEL, KALVEN & BUCHHOLZ,
DELAY IN THE COURT (1959); Strodbeck, Social Process, the Law and Jury Functioning,
in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY (Evan ed. 1962); Zeisel, Social Research on the Law: The Ideal
and the Practical,in LAw AND SoCIOLoGY 124 (Evan ed. 1962); James, Evaluation of

Expert Psychiatric Testimony, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 75 (1960); Kalven, The Jury, the Law
and the PersonalInjury Damage Award, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 158 (1958).
24 On the damage issue, however, it should be noted that the jury's awards average
roughly 20% higher than the judge's.
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stander how can one say that negligence was found by the law and the
community when negligence does not exist? At a deeper level all that
the negligence formula ever required was that the actor be held liable
only when the community judged that the risk he took was not a reasonable one.2 5 It is possible, although there is no evidence here, that the
community is gradually becoming more stringent in its judgments about
the reasonableness of risks in the operation of autos. In a formal sense
no matter how harsh these judgments become the system would remain
essentially a negligence system. In a realistic sense, however, it is conceivable that a point could be reached where negligence in auto accidents
became only a fiction. Whatever might lie in the future, it seems dear
to us that we are not approaching such a point today.
The third objection, that even in theory fault is an unsound criterion,
has several facets. The first is that the law exaggerates the contribution
of the actor's fault to an accident. On a larger view the actor's role is
frequently dwarfed by other causally contributing factors, such as road
engineering, traffic density, car design, traffic regulations, and the performance of other cars just before the accident. The precise challenge is
whether an admitted flaw in the actor's conduct, looked at in the context
of the other causes, is a sufficient basis for determining whether the accident victim is to get compensation.
This challenge appears to mirror the proposition sometimes advanced
in criminal law that the individual actor's contribution to the crime is
overshadowed by such other contributing factors as poor education, poverty, broken home, and so forth. The difficulty with this approach either
in tort or in crime is that it is hard to see what else the law could do
but single out the conduct of the individual actor. Speaking statistically,
we can of course say that road engineering or broken homes are significant causes of accidents or crimes. But this does not help dispose of the
individual case, and the law is charging the actor for a flaw in conduct
that the mass of mankind-including those who come from broken homes
or drive on poorly engineered highways-could have avoided. Although
never philosophical about causation, the law has dearly recognized that
any actor is but one of an infinity of causes of a particular event. It has
dealt with the actor because he was a reachable cause and because his
contribution to the event was relevant and decisive. Even if we concede
25 Compare the observation of Judge Clark in Pease v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d
183, 187 (2d Cir. 1939): "Hence we conclude that the conduct of both parties should
go before the jury. The defendant asserts that such a course, with the corporate
defendant here, means that a verdict for the plaintiff is certain to follow. Even if that
is justifiable prophecy, it still does not mean that the jury is wrong or that a general
community standard as to what should be the risks of the business undertaken by the
defendant must be disregarded."
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that the law always overrates the contribution of the actor, there is
nothing in the auto accident field that gives this perception any special
force.
The critic of the fault criterion might shift his emphasis and follow
another line in pressing the point about the incommensurability of the
actor's flaw and the consequences the law attaches to it. Negligence
covers a multitude of sins, ranging from the grave to the trivial; and
the critic can stress that there is no correlation whatsoever between the
gravity of the sin and the magnitude of the damage caused. If tort
damages were viewed as a system of fines, everyone would agree that the
incidence of sanctions would be absurd, and it would be the rare case in
which the punishment fit the crime. The difference in conduct between
the negligent and the non-negligent drivers is too slight to support the
huge difference in consequences that the fault principle attaches.
Does it matter for tort law that the punishment does not fit the crime?
A sufficient answer is that the purpose of tort law is to compensate and
not to punish; and this is well understood throughout the community
and by the typical defendant. But the critic's point probably overestimates the lack of correlation between risk and damage. On the average
we are likely to find that the magnitude of harm caused correlates fairly
well with the magnitude of the risk taken-in fact, the magnitude of
the potential harm bears a direct relationship to the magnitude of the
risk taken. 26 The critic's point in any event is especially weak in the
case of auto accidents inasmuch as virtually everyone is well aware that
an auto in motion can maim or kill. It is true that on occasion the law
has recognized the point as when it limited liability for a slip of the
pen in the Ultramares case.27 The fact that no such limitation has been
imposed in auto accident situations suggests that the law deliberately
declines to follow the policy in the case of the auto. Be that as it may,
it is improper to invert the process of judgment and argue that a small
amount of harm somehow indicates a small degree of negligence. The
key concept for the law here is risk; and what is constant in these situations is the amount of negligent risk taken-and this is a factor which,
as Holmes noted almost a century ago, is independent of the harm that
28
actually occurs.
Another facet of the objection to fault as a principle builds on the not
implausible assumption that all drivers are at some time or other clearly
negligent. Most negligent conduct, however, is not actionable inasmuch
26 As, for example, in the well-known "calculus of risk" formula of Judge Hand;
see United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
27 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Nevin & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
28 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 79 (1881).
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as it does not cause harm. Whether a given negligent act causes harm
seems to be largely a matter of chance. Since all drivers are in the same
boat morally and only chance distinguishes them, it has been urged that
all drivers ought to pay for the damages inflicted by drivers as a class,
and that it is unjustifiable to place the burden solely on those whom
chance did not favor.
The popular impression that all drivers are alike in being occasionally
negligent is very likely an overestimation, for it fails to take account of
the many minor adjustments in conduct which are made when men
engage in what seems to be essentially the same risky behavior. Driving
eighty miles an hour is not a constant risk, and presumably all recognize
that such a speed in the city entails a markedly higher risk than in the
open country. But driving eighty miles an hour in the city does not
represent a constant risk either, and those who drive at this speed under
similar conditions might well do so with differing degrees of reserve or
caution. It is not unlikely that there are grades of prudence even among
the negligent risk takers. These minor differentiations in all probability
partially account for which of the negligent drivers in fact get into
accidents. And even if we grant that there is a large factor of chance as
to which of the negligent drivers do cause accidents, it does not follow
that the recruitment of drivers to accidents is a random process. Under
the laws of chance, the drivers who take relatively more risks of a given
magnitude are more likely to become involved in accidents than their
29
fellow drivers who take relatively fewer risks of the same magnitude.
The last challenge to fault as a principle echoes the recurring suggestion in much contemporary writing about tort law that a proper criterion
for choice between competing rules is the sheer number of losses that
would be shifted. We should always prefer, we are told, the rule that
results in shifting the largest number of losses off victims. -Using this
criterion at the most general level, it could be said that the basic difficulty with the common law fault rule in the world of the auto is that
it leaves too many victims of auto accidents uncompensated. And we are
offered empirical studies to prove that this is indeed the case.
If the earlier objections to fault run the risk of proving too much, this
one runs the risk of begging the question. It should be abundantly clear
that the common law never has had information about the incidence of
recovery which would follow from the application of its liability rules.
What is more important, it has had no expectations about incidence of
recovery, and could not have cared less. Its commitment to fault as a
basis for shifting losses is independent of any estimates of how many
29 Compare the accident proneness hypothesis; see James & Dickinson, Accident
Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REv. 769 (1950).
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losses will thus be shifted. No empirical study of gaps in loss shifting,
insofar as they rest on the absence of liability, can be relevant. The
striking point is that under the common law system it is intended that
some victims will have to bear their own losses. 30
As familiar as all this is, it marks a critical point of departure. The
question frequently now heard is: "By what arrangement can we most
expeditiously maximize the shifting of losses?" There is a profound
difference between this and the old-fashioned question: "What losses
should be shifted and what losses should the victim bear?" Under the
logic of the common law, there is no meaningful way of answering the
first question unless the second question has already been answered. We
agree with that logic.
3
It will be recalled that we are engaged in salvaging the issues we wish
to discuss. We have dealt with the first barrier to reaching the core policy
issues raised by auto compensation plans-the position that the common
law fault system is so completely unsatisfactory that any change would
be for the better. We now turn to the second barrier-the propensity to
argue that our present system is in operation so dose to a compensation
plan that only the smallest of steps is required to bring the law to a
full plan. On this line of argument, any issue of principle becomes de
minimis.
There are basically four points of departure from which it is urged
that the present system can quickly be converted into a compensation
plan: (1) use of our common law tort doctrine of absolute liability for
harm resulting from ultrahazardous activities; (2) recognition of the
degree to which settlement practices of insurance companies are realistically keyed to a rule of absolute liability in the auto accident field;
(3) extension of the increasingly accepted principle of compulsory auto
liability insurance; (4) adapting to auto accidents the long standing
scheme of handling industrial accidents through workmen's compensation
plans. We now explore in detail these four short routes to a plan.
The common law has never adhered to fault as the exclusive criterion
of tort liability for accidents; the principle of strict liability, which has
a familiar genealogy running from wild animals to Rylands v. Fletcherl
to what section 519 of the Restatement of Torts currently labels as
ultrahazardous activity, has always had a role.32 In areas in which the
30 They may, of course, elect to shift the loss to an insurance fund by buying accident
insurance; see section 7 infra.
31 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
32 For an engaging effort to state a rationale for this wing of tort liability, see
Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. RFv. 401 (1959).
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ultrahazardous principle is conventionally held to apply, if the law were
to compel carrying liability insurance, the result would be a form of
compensation plan. It would appear then that -through the small change
of bringing autos under section 519 and the additional small change of
enacting a compulsory liability insurance law we would find ourselves
with a fullblown compensation plan.
As a matter of technical Restatement doctrine, an activity is ultrahazardous if it "(a) necessarily involves the risk of serious harm . . .
which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b)
is not a matter of common usage."'33 In the comment to the section, it is
said that "automobiles have come into such general use that their operation is a matter of common usage. This, together with the fact that the
risk involved in the careful operation of a carefully maintained automobile is slight, is sufficient to prevent their operation from being an
ultrahazardous activity."3 4 In contrast, the Restatement sees the airplane
as an ultrahazardous activity, not exempted by the common usage
proviso. Putting aside any controversy over the compulsory liability
insurance feature, 35 the barrier that keeps the common law from going
over to an auto compensation plan would appear to be only the issue
of whether operation of autos is a matter of "common usage." There is
no need here to debate the merits of the Restatement's formulation; our
concern is simply to indicate how apparently minor an adjustment of
common law liability thinking would be required to reach a compensation plan by this route. It would seem to involve no more than treating
airplane and auto accidents alike. One ironic comment is in order,
however. The common rhetoric on behalf of auto plans stresses the point
that there are so many autos today that harm from their use has become
a grave social problem requiring a special shift to strict liability. The
Restatement stresses the same point about the number of autos to reach
exactly the opposite conclusion-there are so many autos that, as a matter
of common usage, auto accidents should be left to the negligence
principle.
On closer analysis it appears that the argument from airplane accidents
is made a bit too quickly. The Restatement does distinguish between
airplanes and automobiles for the purpose of selecting the criterion of
liability. But, at best, analogy between the two types of accident is
skewed because it is only with the greatest infrequency that planes crash
in the air. In a common sense view the salient accident problem for the
33 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 520 (1938).

§ 520, comment e (1938).
There might, of course, be considerable controversy over the adoption of compulsory insurance. See materials in GREGORY & KALvEN, op cit. supra note 2, at 733-42.
34 RESTATEMENT, TORTS

35
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auto is harm to the pedestrian or to the driver or passenger of another
car, while the main accident problem for the airplane is harm to the
passenger in the plane that crashes. And what is arresting for our purposes is that the Restatement handles the airplane's main accident problem, the airplane passenger problem, under the negligence rule and
not under strict liability. 36
The real difficulty with the approach via section 519 is that the apparently modest change required to bring the auto under strict liability
turns out on further inspection to be a far-reaching move. If any distinction between ultrahazardous and ordinary risk creating activity is to be
preserved, it is difficult to perceive special characteristics of auto risks
that justify moving the auto across the line. If it is persuasive to see the
use of the auto as ultrahazardous, it can only be because all risk creating
activity is seen as ultrahazardous. To argue this is to abandon the negligence principle altogether.
We would conclude, then, that to cover the auto under strict liability
would require not a small adjustment but the candid abandonment of
the negligence principle for all tort situations. And the fact that at first
blush it appears easy to make a small adjustment in section 519 to place
the auto under strict liability is in the end evidence only of how unsatisfactory and unstable the strict liability formulation of the Restatement turns out to be.
The second short route to an auto compensation plan exploits a
sociological perspective. The thesis is that today the overwhelming
majority of cases are finally disposed of by informal settlement and not
by formal trial, and that whatever the rules of liability which govern
cases in court, a different set of principles seems to govern settlement
practices. It is argued that the only proper way to characterize the
common law system is in terms of these predominating principles. The
crux of the contention is that reading backward from settlement statistics
it can only be inferred that strict liability has replaced fault as the main
governing criterion in the real world.
This line of argument has had a distinguished sponsorship. It was a
central point of the Columbia study in the early thirties. The proponents of the Columbia plan explicitly stated that it was not necessary
to debate the merits of strict liability versus fault because, in view of
settlement practices, we no longer had a system based on fault; and that
so far as liability was concerned, all that their proposed plan would do
was to legitimate a change which had already occurred. Perhaps the most
36 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 523, comment f (1938).
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vigorous statement of the thesis is that by James Landis in his review
37
of the plan in the Harvard Law Review:
The committee avowedly made no inquiry as to the incidence
of fault upon recovery of compensation. The figures, however,
themselves demonstrate that the idea that individual moral
culpabilty is the basis for shifting losses is little more or less
than a pious fraud. Lawyers active in Massachusetts, where compulsory insurance is in force, are becoming aware that in practice the concept of negligence has given way to a working theory
of absolute liability, with negligence only a factor in the measure
of damages. The committee's figures illustrate that this is characteristic in any situation where the injured person seeks recovery
from an insured owner or operator. The percentage of recovery,
without inquiry as to fault, in insured fatal cases runs to 88%,
in insured cases of permanent disability to 96%. It is hardly
conceivable that the line which fault would cleave in these instances runs at all in the neighborhood of these percentages.
Such figures themselves are sufficient to challenge the common
law's naive assumption that fault is discoverable in the majority
of automobile accidents, and yet our whole system, but for the
intervention of a wisely unscientific jury, rests upon such a
theory. Taught law is not tort law.
So stated, the argument has undeniable force. If it is true that the
fault criterion is employed in the disposition of only a small minority of
controversies, there can be no satisfactory ground for defending the retention of a negligence system. To the last generation of legal realists,
this whole line of thought must have appeared as a striking breakthrough
for their approach to law. But looking back, all of this seems to have
been concluded too easily. As noted by Landis, no one was claiming to
have compared the incidence of fault with the incidence of recoverythe fact is that no information was available regarding the incidence of
fault. The conclusion that fault was inoperative as a principle rested
merely on an inference from the statistics of recovery under settlements.
We now have the benefit of several recent studies. One of the most
substantial comes from the on-going Columbia Project for Effective
Justice.3s In 1961 a survey was made of closing statements in all personal
injury cases in New York City. For the year involved, it was estimated
that 193,000 victims sought "to recover damages for injuries ascribed to
837
BOOK REviEw, 45 HARV. L. Rav. 1428-29 (1932).
38 Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLtM. L. RaY. 1 (1961); Rosenberg & Sovem,
Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59 CoLUM. L. Rv. 1116
(1959).
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someone else's fault."3 9 The new Columbia study traces the history of
these claims and dramatically corroborates the central findings of the
1932 study. 40 Less than 2% of the claims-a total of about 2,500-were
disposed of by trial; more than 98%-a total of 190,500-were disposed
of by settlement. Of the 193,000 claims, the victim recovered at least
something in 84% or 162,000 instances, while in 16% or 31,000 instances
there was no recovery at all.
On the basis of other information it has been estimated that 13% of
all auto accident victims do not file a claim and seek recovery. 41 If we
add this 13% (or some 27,000 victims) who do not file a claim and the
above 16% of those who file and who are unsuccessful (some 31,000
victims), we reach a total of 58,000 victims, 27% of the total number of
auto accident victims, who recover nothing. There is no way of determining in precisely how many of these cases the fault principle barred
recovery, but the study itself estimated that for all claims it would be
"something less than 25 per cent." 42 Moreover, of those who succeeded
in obtaining recovery in New York City, which is a notably high award
area, 70% got $1,000 or less, 47% got $600 or less, while 25% got $300 or
less. If we put together those who recovered nothing and those who
recovered $300 or less, we see that in 1961 roughly half of all the auto
accident victims in New York City received $300 or less.
Interpretation of these figures requires two further qualifications. It
is almost certain that a considerable number of the recoveries under
$300 reflected "nuisance" settlements rather than payments made in
recognition of possible liability. And where there were recoveries, whatever the level of settlement, we have no way of determining the extent
to which the amount was "discounted"-that is, reduced in recognition
of the risk that in litigation no liability would be found. It is wholly
misleading, for example, to infer from a settlement of a $40,000 claim
for $20,000, in a jurisdiction where the calendar is current, that the
parties were operating on a strict liability principle; with equal plausibility it can be assumed that they got together on the assumption that
in litigation there was a 50% chance of full recovery and a 50% chance
of no liability. 43 What little information is available about the psychol39 Franklin, Chanin & Mark, supra note 38, at 10.
40 These same basic points are corroborated in James & Law, supra note 7. See also
ZEISEL, KALVEN & BUcHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE CouRT ch. 3 (1959).
41 HUNTING & NEUWIRTH, WHO SuEs IN NEW YORK CrrY (1962);

see also Zeisel,

Book Review, N.Y.L.J., June 1962.
42 Franklin, Chanin & Mark, supra note 38, at 34.
43 Insofar as the settlement data came from a jurisdiction with court delay, there is
also the possibility that the reduced damages reflect a "time discount," introduced by
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ogy of settlements indicates that the participants in the process at least
profess that they have the fault principle in mind during negotiations
and that they come to terms on the basis of predictions about the odds
on liability.

44

Whatever the dominance of the settlement process, we should not
lose sight altogether of the 2% of the cases that went to trial. A substantial amount of data from sources other than the Columbia Project
all converge on the conclusion that when the controversy goes to litigation the defendant prevails, with a finding of no liability, about 45% of
45
the time.
A recent study, by Clarence Morris and James Paul, of the compensation of victims in auto accidents during 1946 in southeastern Pennsylvania, provides another highly useful view of the law in action.4 6 In
contrast to the New York estimate of 27%, the Pennsylvania study shows
that some 47% of victims obtained no recovery. More important, the
Pennsylvania study provides a comparison between the amounts actually
received by the victims and the amounts of their medical expenses and
loss of earnings-the so-called "hard" losses. It is fair to assume that in
most instances where recovery is less than the amount of "hard" loss,
the discount is attributable to the shadow of non-liability.47 Using this
formula we can then say that in 11% of the cases there was a discounted
recovery. Putting together the 47% no recoveries and the 11% discounted
awards, it is seen that something in the neighborhood of 58% of the
claims may have been subject to the discipline of the liability issue. The
frequency of discounted awards, moreover, rises sharply with the size
of the claims. If, for example, we look only at claims for over $5,000, we
can infer that in 44% of the cases the recovery was discounted.
Admittedly none of these figures is free from ambiguity.46 But they
leave no doubt that the system in operation cannot realistically be
characterized as one of strict liability, even when we consider only the
the threat of delay. The plaintiff might settle for less in order to get his money
sooner; see also ZEiSEL, KALVEN & BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT chs. 10, 12 (1959).
44 ZEISEL, KALVEN & BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT 105-09 (1959); Schneider,
Accident Litigation: The Common Man Sues, 287 ANNALS 69, 73-74 (1953); Smithson,
Liability Claims and Litigation, 1958 INs. L.J. 375, 381-82.
45 For example, in the Jury Project Study of judge-jury disagreements in civil cases
(see note 23 supra), we find for a national sample of some 4000 jury trials that the
defendant does win before the jury in roughly 44% of the cases.
46 Morris & Paul, supra note 11.
47 With a qualification again, however, for the possibility of a "time discount" due
to court delay, see note 43 supra.
48 The study of Michigan auto accidents by Conard, which is about to be published, will hopefully put some of these ambiguities to rest; see note 12 supra.

AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS

1964]

cases disposed of by settlement and not by litigation. Tort law after all
may be taught law.
A third short route to an auto compensation plan builds upon the
implications of compulsory liability insurance statutes. We refer here
to a general statute which requires liability insurance coverage as a
condition to owning or operating an automobile. Such statutes are not to
be confused with compensation plans since they do not and are not intended to change the basis of tort liability. Under compulsory liability
insurance laws, liability for auto accidents is still keyed to negligence.
Further, such measures are not to be confused with a variety of statutes
extending the compulsion of insuring to a limited group of operators,
as, for example, the laws regulating common carriers or the so-called
financial responsibility acts. 49 Our concern is with a law which imposes
the obligation to insure against liability on the entire auto owning or
driving population of a state.
General compulsory insurance laws were intended to close any gaps
in auto victim recovery which are due to insolvency of motorists; they
were not intended to close the gaps in recovery due to the incidence of
liability under the existing rules of law. Except for the insurance lobby,
which has been almost heroic in the steadfastness of its opposition to
these laws, there is now wide acceptance of the policy behind them.50
The hope of easy transition from compulsory insurance to an auto compensation plan is founded on the very fact that compulsory insurance
itself is now so widely acceptable. In briefest form the argument is that
anyone who accepts the principle of compulsory liability insurance is no
longer in a position where he can logically or even psychologically reject an auto compensation plan. 51 Two versions of the argument are
made, one simple and crude, the other ingenious and tempting. Both
versions rest on the perception that a compulsory insurance statute has
necessarily created a massive insurance fund for paying accident victims.
The simple version argues that only a de minimis adjustment is needed
to adapt such a fund to the needs of a compensation plan. Since on
49

Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUm.

L. REv. 300 (1950).
50 EHRENZWEIG, "FULL Am" INSURANCE, (1954); KLINE & PEARSON, THE PRoBLENI
OF
UNINSURED MOTORIST, (State of New York Insurance Department, 1951); Kalven,

THE

Compulsory Auto Insurance?, Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 24, 1957, § 2, p. 3; McVay,
The Case Against Compulsory Automobile Insurance, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 150 (1954).
51 As a matter of convenience in discussion, we are assuming that there will not be
"under insurance" in a compulsory insurance scheme. In fact, however, the tendency
of such laws is to set a low minimum for the required amount of insurance, and
motorists then tend to insure only up to the minimum. Netherton, Highway Safety
Under Differing Types of Liability Legislation, 15 OHIo ST. L.J. 110, 125 (1954); THE
UNINSURED MoToRusr, 3 Virginia Ass'n of Insurance Agents (1957).
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hypothesis every auto already has insurance coverage, 52 all that the great
reform requires to provide compensation to all victims is a modest adjustment upwards of insurance premiums. An initial difficulty with this
approach is that the additional cost obviously will depend on the
design and detail of the plan. If it turns out that only a small change
in premium is required, the explanation might well be that awards
under the compensation plan have been set at a radically low level.
Perhaps this is a sufficient answer to the simple thesis. 53
But what troubles and interests us in this approach is a different aspect. There is to us something odd in having the policy issue turn on
what these cost magnitudes are thought to be. We sense that if the increase in annual premium were to be large, say $100, this would be taken
as an argument against turning compulsory insurance into a compensation plan. And conversely if the extra premium were to be small, say
$5, this would be taken as an irresistible argument for making the shift.
Under the common law it was natural to take seriously the issue of
liability, for it posed the question of placing the full loss of an accident
on one person or another. When the issue today is restated in insurance
terms, it poses nothing more than how much the premium should be for
each member of the very large community of insureds. On our view,
however, the atomizing of the liability question into insurance premiums
should not be permitted to cause the liability issue to evaporate. It should
continue to be just as weighty an issue of policy. It is here that public
law, and taxation in particular, offers a useful and needed perspective
to tort law. Suppose it were proposed today to lower the personal exemption under the federal income tax from $600 to $500. Such a change,
which would increase the tax by no more than $15 for most single
taxpayers without dependents, would undoubtedly be regarded as
raising a genuine issue of policy.5 4 The concern with policy would be
all the greater if it were proposed to reduce the exemption only for
persons over fifty years of age. We are not passing judgment on these
proposals; rather we wish to point out that those concerned with our
tax system would hardly contend that the proposals raised no policy
issue simply because the change in tax for any one taxpayer would be
so small. Proposals to raise premiums under compulsory insurance
schemes should be regarded in the same way because, given the com52 It appears to be irrelevant for the purposes of our analysis whether we think of
the insurance as "covering" the motorist or the auto.
53 Perhaps it is not; see the discussion in section 6 infra of the various possibilities
of reallocating damages in order to finance a plan.
54 For taxpayers in higher rate brackets the change in exemption level would have
greater dollar consequences.
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pulsion by the state to insure, premium payments are close to a form of
taxation. Altering the level or distribution of premiums is little different
from changing the level or distribution of a tax. Hence the change from
compulsory liability insurance to a compensation plan cannot be dismissed as being de minimis.
The more sophisticated version of the argument to a compensation
plan from a compulsory insurance statute is not so easy to put to rest.
Once the insurance fund has been created, so the argument goes, it is
not the business of the insureds how the fund is distributed, so long as
there is no increase in premiums and no exposure to additional liability. 55
In effect it is argued that one could devise a plan that merely would call
for distributing the fund differently-that is, in accordance with strict
liability rules and a reduced scale for damages. The conception is that
whatever the size of the fund and whatever the demands upon it, some
payments could be made to all victims without additional cost to the
insureds. We are concerned here only with the single question whether
the insureds have any basis for complaining about a reallocation of the
fund.5 6 Can this approach to a compensation plan succeed in sidestepping
any of the major policy issues that are raised when it is proposed to move
directly from the prevailing fault system to a compensation plan?
The question so put raises a refreshingly novel issue of policy. 57 Undoubtedly the case for a plan under this approach would have considerable political appeal since motorists could be silenced by the contention that they would be no worse off under the plan than they were
before and therefore are in no position to complain. And if, as would be
likely, insurance premiums were at some later day increased in order
to raise awards, the motorists would then seem to have already surrendered any objection to the plan on principle. Thus the approach might
appear to be an ideal strategy for moving to a compensation plan without ever confronting the underlying policy questions.
But alert motorists would find the first step to be one they could and
should challenge. Again an analogy from taxation provides a guideline.
We are familiar with gasoline taxes which are levied exclusively for the
purpose of building and maintaining roads. Suppose the community
levying such a tax decided that less money should be put into roads and
more into school buildings. Would not a user of gasoline then have a
55 We assume that the insurance would be sufficient to cover the liability so that
payment of premiums would in effect "discharge" any potential tort liability of the
insured. See discussion of "under insurance" in note 51 supra.
56 Other policy issues raised by reallocating the damages fund are discussed in detail
in section 6 infra.
57 The idea we here exploit is borrowed directly from EHRENZWEIG, "FULL Am"
INSURANCE (1954).
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legitimate objection to holding the gasoline tax at the prevailing level
in order to finance the expanded school program, even assuming that
the school program is a proper use of public funds? The gasoline tax
was initially justified on a benefit theory, meaning that gasoline users
were financing a government operation of special benefit to them. The
proposed school program cannot be made to fit into that same mould. If
the road program is to be curtailed, so that less tax money is needed for
its support, it would seem to follow that the gasoline tax should be
trimmed accordingly. By the same token, those required to purchase
liability insurance under compulsory insurance legislation are "taxed"
for their premium in order to provide "benefits" to the victims of their
negligence. If it is decided to modify the "expenditure" which is thus
financed, and to include "benefits" to other victims, the initial theory of
the "tax" would not itself support diverting for this purpose the money
so collected.58 Indeed, the analogy would call for reducing the premiums
which motorists were compelled to pay. It is almost a sleight of hand
to reject the fault principle in seeking to broaden the base for recoveries
and yet at the same time to use the fault principle in compelling motorists to carry insurance. Once the law is liberated from fault, motorists
can appropriately ask why they should pay anything.
The fourth short route to an auto compensation plan is the most
familiar. It is simply to argue from the analogy to industrial accidents
under workmen's compensation. In briefest form the argument is that
if a compensation plan keyed to strict liability is correct policy for one
great area of accidents it should be equally correct policy for another.
This has been the classic analogy for proponents of compensation plans.
At this late date, only an extremely hardy soul would argue for the
repeal of workmen's compensation. The question before us, therefore, is
whether the basic policy issues we wish to explore for auto accidents are
not already foreclosed by the decision of the society, which we accept,
adopting workmen's compensation.
How close is the analogy? It is worth remembering that a half century ago Jeremiah Smith confronted this issue and dramatically proclaimed that the analogy was so close that the two liability principlesthat of the common law and that of workmen's compensation-were
utterly and uncompromisingly contradictory. 59 Society must choose, he
58 There will almost certainly be controversy as to whether the "purpose" of the
tax has essentially changed. We assume in the text that there has been an essential
change in purpose.

59 Smith, The Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARv. L. REV. 235, 344
(1914). See also Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen's
Compensation, 12 LA. L. REv. 231, 234 (1952).
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thundered, between the one or the other. 60 The record is now clear that
Smith was not much of a prophet on this issue-society has tolerated
this particular inconsistency for fifty years now. The question for us is
how good an analyst was he?
We will not do more than note that there has been a curious instance
of cultural lag in the conventional arguments from workmen's compensation. Workmen's compensation is being looked to as the model of a
brilliant social reform at a time when, for those familiar with the field,
the bloom is off the rose and there is sharp criticism of the meagerness
and rigidity of award schedules, and of the costs, delays, irregularities
and suspected corruption in the operation of the system.6 1
Nor will we do more than mention several differences, which some
observers have urged as critical, between the industrial accident situation
and the auto accident situation. It is said that while the industrial
accident is relatively fixed and easy to investigate, the auto accident is
more transient and difficult to investigate. The result is that there are
likely to be great differences in the opportunities for policing fraudulent
claims in the two areas. 62 It is also said that damages are more amenable
to scheduling in the one case than in the other, both because the range
and variety of physical injuries is more restricted in the industrial accident, and because the injured personnel are drawn from a fairly homogeneous economic group.63 These are acute observations, and they do
point up specific difficulties which would be encountered in administering a compensation plan, but they do not cut deep enough to put to
rest Jeremiah Smith's challenge of fundamental inconsistency.
There are three residual differences which lead us to deny the analogy
to workmen's compensation. First, there is a great difference between
the common law system for industrial accidents which workmen's compensation was created to replace and the common law system for auto
accidents which exists today. Under the law of fifty years ago, we are
told, the ability of the injured employee to recover was greatly circumscribed by the well-known trilogy of employer defenses-assumption of
60 "Without indicating our own view as to the intrinsic justice, either of the Work-

men's Compensation Legislation or of the common law of A.). 1900, it seems safe to
say that the basic principles of the two are irreconcilable. They cannot both be wholly
right, or both wholly wrong." Smith, supra note 59, at 368.
61 Compare Riesenfeld, Basic Problems in the Administration of Workmen's Compensation, 36 MINN. L. REv. 119 (1952).
62 Lilly, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUm. L. REv.
803 (1932); Monaghan, The Liability Claim Racket, 3 LAw & CONTENP. POB. 491
(1936).
63 Brown, Automobile Accident Litigation in Wisconsin: A Factual Study, 10 WIs.
L. REv. 170 (1934).
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risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant rule. The old law
has looked to some like a conspiracy to throw the losses of industrial
accidents onto employees as a class at a time when they were conspicuously less well off than their employers. There is no comparable harshness in the law which confronts the auto accident claimant today. In the
same vein, the whole "welfare" support for workmen's compensation is
considerably diluted today in the auto accident area. First party insurance and social legislation have come on the scene and have greatly
reduced the likelihood that the auto accident victim and his family will
bear the full brunt of the accident.
A second difference is that the enterprise situation made possible a
popular myth as to how the cost of workmen's compensation was to be
borne. The widespread image was that by placing the cost of workmen's
compensation on employers the cost would be passed on to consumers of
their products through operation of market forces. The result was
thought to be that not only social justice but economic justice would
be accomplished; and this view of the matter was crystallized in the
slogan that the cost of products should reflect the blood of workmen.
Although there are good reasons today for doubting whether consumers
do bear the cost of workmen's compensation, 64 for our immediate purposes it is enough that there is no one in the auto situation who occupies
a role which the employer was popularly thought to play in the industrial
accident situation-no one, that is, who could be regarded as being in
a position to pass on the costs to consumers via the market.
A third difference challenges the view that workmen's compensation
offers a competing doctrine of tort liability. There is no doubt that this
is the traditional view; workmen's compensation was enacted to repeal
and replace common law tort rules, and it was challenged and ratified in
court on that premise. 65 We wish to suggest here a considerably different
view of the history and rationale. In retrospect, we are impressed that
workmen's compensation can best be understood as a kind of "fringe
benefit" incorporated by law into the basic employment contract. The
law in effect compelled the employer to provide, as a term of employment, an industrial accident policy for his employees.
Several strands of thought support this perspective. In his highly regarded casebook on Agency, Roscoe Steffen groups materials so as to
place workmen's compensation as part of the employment relationship. 66
He suggests that the legal history of personal injuries to employees could
64 H.
65

G. BROWN, THE ECONOMICS
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ch. 6 (1924).

New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916); Ives v. South Buffalo Ry.,

201 N.Y. 201, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
66 STEFFEN, CASES ON AGENCY

§§ 9-10 (2d ed. 1952).

1964]

AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS

easily have been different-that courts could readily have handled the
whole problem as an aspect of the employee's indemnity action against
the employer for losses incurred in the course of an agency relationship.6 7
There is a contemporary analogue in the tendency today to use workmen's compensation as a base, and through collective bargaining to
expand the benefits to cover unemployment, sickness and accidents off
work. 68 What we wish to emphasize is that this continuum from statutory
benefits to collective bargaining agreements can be read backwards, so
as to view the whole as part of the employer-employee contract. The
distinctive quality is that each of these forms of coverage is tied in to the
employment nexus. On this view the issue to which workmen's compensation is addressed is primarily that of determining the terms and conditions of employment.
In stressing this somewhat novel rationale for workmen's compensation,
our chief purpose has been to point up a significant difference between
the industrial accident and the auto accident. Unlike workmen's compensation, there is no contractual nexus on which auto compensation
plans can build.
Thus we conclude that the reason society has for so long tolerated
different legal principles for industrial accidents and for the tort field
generally is that, Jeremiah Smith to the contrary, the two areas are
essentially different.
4
In the discussion of auto compensation, it is generally assumed that
the state will have to intervene with its coercive powers to effectuate the
plan. But in the last fifteen years, the possibility of a voluntary plan has
drawn increased attention. It will be convenient for us to indulge in
one more analytic detour before proceeding to discuss compensation
plans on their merits, and to ask whether society can arrive at a plan
through wholly voluntary action. It goes without saying that the policy
questions disappear if voluntary action produces a plan.
In an article in 1948, Fleming James reviewed the major developments
in the automobile liability insurance policy, such as the omnibus clause
and the medical payments clause, and concluded that a revolution in
67 "The transition, all within less than a century, from an individualistic economy
engaged in petty trade to the present highly specialized industrial system made it
necessary for the courts to formulate much new 'law.' Ready at hand was the indemnity pattern already marked out to cover the agents' pecuniary risks." Id. at 146-47.
See D'Arcy v. Lyle, 5 Binn. 441 (Pa. 1813). Compare MALONE & PLANT, CAsES ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION X (1963).
08 Katz & Wirpel, Workmen's Compensation 1910-1950: Are Present Benefits Adequate?, 4 LAB. L.J. 167 (1953); Larson, The Future of Workmen's Compensation, 6
NACCA L.J. 18 (1950).
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auto accident compensation was being quietly accomplished through
contract on the initiative of insurance companies. 69 About a decade ago,
Albert Ehrenzweig, building on the medical payments or first-aid clause,
proposed a scheme of what he called Full Aid Insurance, which he
claimed yielded a voluntary compensation plan."° And a year or so ago,
Robert A. Rennie, an insurance executive, saw in the modern family
compensation coverage provision the germ of a fully developed compensation plan. 71 Thus the idea of a plan through voluntary contract is
certainly in the air.
The common denominator here is that the auto owner voluntarily
insures beyond his liability. In the case of the omnibus clause, the owner
is in effect buying liability coverage for one who drives his car with his
consent but for whose negligence in many instances he would not be
liable. In the case of the medical payments clause the owner is in effect
buying accident insurance for occupants of his car for whose injuries he
again in many instances might not be liable. The broad vision is that
since owners will go this far voluntarily, they might be persuaded to go
farther and buy accident coverage for anyone injured by their car regardless of liability. If so, the result would be the functional equivalent of a
compensation plan and would have been arrived at voluntarily.
The recent development of the so-called family compensation coverage in liability policies comes closest to this vision. Under the coverage,
the insured, his passengers, and third party claimants are given the option
of accepting payment under a schedule contained in the policy in lieu of
resorting to their common law remedy. The current schedule in one such
policy has been described as follows: "[I]t provides immediate benefits
with limits of $2,900 in case of injury and $7,900 in case of death for
each person regardless of fault. These benefits cover medical expenses
up to $2,000 for each injured person. In addition, there are disability
indemnity benefits at $5 per day for 180 days plus a death benefit of
$5,000 per person." 72
The earlier forms of meta-liability insurance, such as the omnibus
clause, suggested strongly the idea of Good Samaritan insurance tempered by the social utility of doing a favor for one to whom you were
lending your car. It is obvious that so long as people are willing to make
gifts to others through insurance coverage, there is no limit to the extension of coverage by voluntary contract. The family compensation
69 James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57
YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
70 Ehrenzweig, "FULL AID" INSURANCE (1954).

An Experiment in Limited Absolute Liability, 29 J. INS. 177 (1963).
at 179-80.

71 Rennie,

72 Id.
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schedule brings in another theme. The provision is in effect simply a
firm offer of settlement from the insurance company. The motivation
for it is the desire to speed up the settlement process, to eliminate lawyer
interference, and to effect economies in the company's handling of claims.
Again, it is obvious that so long as the injured are willing to settle on
the scheduled terms, there is no limit to the extension of recovery by
voluntary contract. The crucial question is, therefore, how far this
strategy of voluntary contract can move us toward providing satisfactory
compensation for all accident victims.
The data reported for the early years of experience under the family
compensation provision are illuminating; they make it abundantly dear
that there is no magic in these matters and that the expected sources of
resistance will be stubborn indeed.
The provision was sold in two ways: with an explicit charge for the
additional coverage and with an arrangement for remittance of premium for those who did not choose the additional coverage. The extra
premium cost was roughly $6 to $7 a year. Under the remittance scheme,
where affirmative action was required to avoid the new coverage, some
66% of the insureds accepted the coverage. However, under the separate
charge arrangement, where affirmative action was required to obtain the
coverage, only 33% of insureds did so. 73 This suggests the central difficulty with all such proposals: They must rely on the charity of the
insured, if he understands what he is being asked to buy, and few
people are likely to be very charitable. In brief, Good Samaritan insurance will appeal largely to Good Samaritans.
Another aspect of the reported data concerns the kinds of claims on
which the offer of settlement was accepted. Two strong impressions
emerge. One is that statistically the very small claims dominate: thus 63%
of all payments to third parties under the schedule were less than $50,
79% were less than $100, and 90% were less than $200. The other impression is that in the occasional case of a substantial payment under the
schedule, the claimant is unlikely to have qualified for recovery under
common law. The suspicions these figures tend to confirm are that a
strict liability offer of settlement of this sort is likely to recruit largely
the nuisance claims and the clear no-liability cases, and that it likely will
leave largely untouched the main business of the common law torts
system today.7 4
73 Id. at 181.
74 It thus functions somewhat perversely as a plan, tending to give prompt recov-

ery to what at common law were the weaker claims. Further, it is unlikely to provide
a remedy for court congestion by affecting the settlement ratio. See ZEiSEL, KALVEN &
BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT, 108 n.5 (1959).
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These two inescapable difficulties of voluntary coverage can be expected to reinforce each other. As the generosity of the settlement offer
is increased in order to extend its effectiveness, the cost of the provision
to the insured will also increase. And as that cost rises, the attractiveness
of the provision to the insured will diminish. In the end, the main
promise for a voluntary plan, except as it conceals from insureds the
cost of such extended coverage, is the undertaking of the insurance companies to procure and disburse the gifts made by the insureds-and
nothing more.
We thus conclude that only a very limited approach to a plan can be
made through the voluntary route, and that to reach a full scale plan
the coercion of the state is required. And we would observe further that
the reluctance of motorists to make charitable contributions to a fund for
accident victims underscores the importance of finding a sound and
convincing basis for employing the powers of the state to compel the
contributions.
5
We have devoted our efforts thus far to salvaging the issues we now
wish to confront. On our view we have established that fault is a sufficiently feasible criterion of liability so that the current system cannot
be said to fall of its own weight; that the current system in actual operation, particularly in the context of liability insurance and the settlement
practices of insurance companies, does not so closely approach a de facto
compensation scheme that we are simply being asked to legitimate a
change that has already occurred; and that no combination of voluntary
action is likely to produce a compensation plan. To change from the
common law system to a compensation plan will make a real difference.
We now wish to explore the merits of using state power to effectuate
such a change.
As we noted at the outset, one main objective of compensation plans
is the elimination of any gaps in coverage due not to liability rules but
to insolvency of motorists. For this purpose, plans rely on creating a
fund through compulsory insurance or the taxing power, out of which
claims are to be paid.75 Although all plans have this underwriting
element, it is not a distinctive characteristic. Nothing prevents the
common law from using compulsory liability insurance.
But all compensation plans do have two common characteristics
which mark their key differences from the common law. The distinctive
feature of the common law is that it does not intend that all victims of
accidents recover; it leaves the loss where it falls for certain categories
75 If the taxing power is used, there need not be, in a literal sense, a fund built up.
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of victims-the single car accident victim, the negligent victim, and the
victim in an accident where the other party was not negligent. The
liability pattern and hence the criteria as to when compensation will be
paid are deliberately complex. As a consequence, there frequently is
controversy over the merits of particular claims and delay in paying
claims destined ultimately to be paid.
All compensation plans have as their two main targets the elimination
of some or all the gaps in common law coverage and a drastic improvement in the timing of payment to victims3 6 These two objectives are
necessarily interrelated. The improvement in timing of awards depends
on extension of coverage. Acceleration of payment to victims rests
largely on simplifying the liability criteria, and this in turn rests in
large part on extending the coverage of victims so as to hold to a
minimum the job of distinguishing between good and bad claims. A
proper appraisal of the merits of plans calls for looking at both the
coverage issue and the timing issue. Since on our view the coverage issue
is the more basic, our agenda for discussion will be first to examine at
length extension of coverage and only then to turn to improvement in
the timing of compensation.
To accomplish the extension of coverage, a plan must change the
allocation of costs generally. Stated simply, the money for the newly
covered victims must come from somewhere. There have been various
suggestions as to where the money should come from, and it is these that
for us mark the most important differences among the plans. A recurrent
image, derived from thinking in common law liability categories, is that
the only possibility is to put the cost of additional coverage on motorists.
It is important to stress that there are three major alternatives. One is to
put none of the cost of additional coverage on motorists, but to redistribute losses among victims through changing the rules as to damages,
thus in effect placing the cost of the additional coverage on some victims.
Another possibility is to take all the costs off actual victims and to place
the cost of all accidents on all potential victims, thereby putting the
costs of accidents on society as a whole rather than on some identifiable
group in society. Still another possibility is to finance the additional
coverage out of the economies of administration expected to be derived
from moving to a plan. We might note in passing that most, if not all,
76 There may also be the advantage of "pacing" payments to the victim so as to
reduce the danger of his squandering a large capital sum. It is another characteristic
of the common law that it took no interest in what happened to damages once they
were paid in a lump sum to the plaintiff. Occasionally, in a creative settlement, the
money has been put into a trust fund. See James, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An Unanswered Challenge, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 408,
412 (1959).
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plans proposed to date are hybrids which have drawn on a combination
of two or more of these possibilities.
From the beginning the common law has had the simple view that
when a loss was shifted it could only be shifted from one individual to
another; and when liability insurance came along it was seen officially
only as a device for guaranteeing the solvency of parties onto whom a
loss might be shifted. 77 The right of a plaintiff to compensation was
necessarily paralleled by the duty of a defendant to compensate him.
Therefore the cost issue as such did not arise but was handled automatically through disposition of the liability issue. By way of contrast,
under plans the compensation question is divorced from the cost question. If the loss is to be shifted, it is viewed as being shifted from the
individual victim to a compensation fund. And, correlatively, the duty
to contribute to a fund for accident victims is thought of as having only
the faintest resemblance to common law liability for negligent conduct.
We have now reached a point where we can put our own position
affirmatively. If the additional coverage sought by a plan could be
accomplished without cost to anyone, there of course would be no
argument against obtaining something for nothing. But so long as there
is a cost which must somehow be borne, we have not succeeded in escaping the original tough policy question of the common law: What is
the fair way of allocating the cost of losses from auto accidents? The
affirmative issues we wish to discuss are presented by the choices available among the alternative avenues for distributing the cost of additional
loss shifting.
6
One major alternative for shifting losses under compensation plans is
to hold constant the costs to motorists and to obtain money for the
desired additional coverage by changing the pattern in which the compensation fund is distributed among victims. To develop this alternative
all we need is the simple idea that one way of finding money to cover
new victims is to give less to victims already compensable under common law.
We are not unmindful that in exploring short cuts to plans we touched
on the strategy of reaching a plan by redistributing the fund from which
damages are to be paid. 78 It will be helpful to summarize here the thrust
of our prior discussion. In brief we do not find persuasive the contention
that a plan will be costless because the reduction in damage awards can
77
78

Laube, The Social Vice of Accident Indemnity, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 189 (1931).
See section 3 supra.
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be made large enough to defray the cost of covering additional victims.
Our view is that if such reductions are effectuated, the benefits in justice
belong to the motorists insured. To divert the benefits to new victims,
through a plan, is no more plausible to us than to give them to charity.
Nevertheless, we recognize that there is great political appeal to the
strategy of appearing to hold costs constant by financing additional coverage through rearranging the pattern of damage awards. We are also
aware that for half a century it has been characteristic of plans to propose that part of the loss be borne by victims79 -indeed, workmen's compensation was ratified constitutionally on the basis of a legislative bargain
under which the employer was seen as trading his liability advantages
at common law for a limitation on damages.8 0 It will be worthwhile,
therefore, to explore the implications of this alternative for shifting
losses, without prejudicing our underlying objection to financing a plan
by juggling damage levels.
The focus of discussion now changes from criticisms of common law
liability theory to consideration of common law damages theory. Emancipated for the moment from the common law idea of awarding full compensation for personal injury due to the fault of another, we reach the
not often asked question: What other criteria might there be for determining how to distribute a compensation fund among accident victims?
Several deserve exploration.
The common law damage system has two hallmarks: damages are
tailored to the individual case, and the damage principle, whatever its
imperfections relating to fees and interest, looks to awarding full compensation to victims.8 ' It follows that there are two basic courses for
changing the common law. The principle of individualized damages
could be given up and damages computed on the basis of a schedule, or
the level of awards could be lowered.
To aid in analysis here we will begin by exercising the academic prerogative of proposing a model that is most unlikely to find supporters in
the real world. The simplest approach to financing coverage for additional victims by reducing the level of damages would be to treat the
fund, created by insurance, as though it were the assets of a bankrupt's
estate and to provide for some variety of pro-rata distribution among
79

This was, for example, a principal point in the original Ballentine proposal.

Ballentine, A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims, 29 -A~v. L. Rav. 705
(1916).
80 See note 65 supra.
81 Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIo
ST. L.J. 158 (1958). This remains true under comparative negligence. Damages are measured under a full compensation principle even though there is a discount for plaintiff's own faulty contribution to the damages.
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victims. This might even be done literally by retaining the common law
criteria of damages in order to get a base figure for each victim which
then could be scaled down by an appropriate fraction. For example, if
the additional coverage doubled the number of claimants, each would
receive one-half the damages as measured by common law standards.
Under this model there would be several striking results: All victims
would get some recovery; all victims who would have been compensable
at common law would be worse off under the plan; all victims would
bear part of their loss themselves without shifting it; all victims would
bear their loss in the same ratio; and the extent to which losses were
compensated under the scheme would depend merely on how much was
in the fund and how many victims there were to share it-and thus the
new coverage could be financed regardless of what its cost turned out
to be.
However rough, this model has the merit of raising sharply two issues
basic to all proposals to reallocate damages. If the common law assessment of damages is thought to be correct, then any reduction will represent a real loss to the hitherto eligible victims. We are then confronted
with the question of what the offsetting gain from increased coverage is.
The answer is quite interesting: The gain in coverage can only inure
to the benefit of those hitherto ineligible for recovery, and this means
the single car accident victim, the negligent victim, and the victim of
the non-negligent driver. We thus reach an issue that has considerable
bite-whether we should shift awards away from "deserving victims" in
order to compensate "less deserving victims." 8 2 Further, if the plan is to

leave some of the loss where it falls, why should it not leave all of it
there? One answer undoubtedly would be that such a model offers a
prudent way of splitting losses between actors and victims. This rejoinder, however, is not persuasive; the common law itself might well
be viewed as a system that also splits losses between actors and victims.
And the common law solution of vertical splitting-full recoveries in
some cases and no recoveries in others-might well have more appeal
than the new proposal for horizontal splitting-partial recoveries in
all cases.
A second model for damages, which also calls for retaining the common law principle of individualized damages, would finance the coverage
of additional victims by restricting compensation to so-called "realistic" losses. The underlying thought is that the common law now over82 The adjective "less deserving" is a bit unfair. The majority of the beneficiaries
will be those who would have been barred by contributory negligence at common law;
however, the other beneficiaries will be the victims of single car accidents and the
victims in accidents where there was no negligence on the part of any driver.
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compensates victims by awarding damages for pain and suffering. This
approach to financing a plan is responsive to a widely-voiced criticism
of the common law system of damages-a criticism which often is made
83
independently of any concern with compensation plans.
While it is fashionable today to talk of eliminating pain and suffering
as a luxury item of damages, and while it is true also that workmen's
compensation has made a successful stab at this for over a generation,
the case for compensating pain and suffering is not without strength.
The whole idea of pain and suffering is usually taken too literally by
its critics, as though it were a third specific heading of damages which
the jury or judge adds on to medical expense and economic loss in
computing the total damages. The University of Chicago Law School's
Jury Project has developed data which suggests that the process of
pricing injuries is far more fluid: It is much more a search for a felt
appropriate sum for the particular injury than it is a problem of addition.84 If pain and suffering were ruled out in instructing juries, damage
awards by juries might well be as high as they are now. The jury seems
to be responding not to pain as such but to the dignitary aspects of the
injury, and these can be considerable in cases where there is no pain.
It is not merely sentimentality of the jury that is at work. Consider the
case of the man who loses a leg in an accident; assume he makes a rapid
successful adjustment, gets his job back and suffers no current pain.8 5
What is at stake in the debate over pain and suffering is whether the
law is to treat him as entitled only to compensation for his medical expense plus temporary loss of income, or whether it is to ti-y to translate
into monetary terms the gross indignity he has suffered, which has surely
altered his entire life. To pursue seriously the removal of pain and
suffering leads quickly to the more challenging issue of eliminating all
compensation for dignitary harm. And this is especially true when we
remember that auto accident redress, unlike workmen's compensation,
must cover a wide and heterogeneous army of claimants. The typical
workmen's compensation plaintiff is a wage earner within a fairly narrow
age range and even narrower salary range; it is plausible to think of his
loss as measured by loss of wages. A substantial number of auto accident
victims are in other categories: the very young child whose economic
loss cannot even be conjectured, the housewife who has never previously
83 Jaffe, Damages for PersonalInjury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 219 (1953); Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLum. L. REv. 476 (1959);
Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 200 (1958).
84 Kalven, supra note 81.
85 Compare McNulty v. Southern Pacific Co., 96 Cal. App. 2d 841, 216 P.2d 534
(1950).
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earned money, the retired person living off an annuity, and so on. In
these cases the economic loss is impossible to locate and unless damages
are to be limited to medical expenses, some recognition of dignitary
losses must be left in the system. 86
As we look at other damage models for financing plans, it is noteworthy that all turn away from the common law principle of individualized damages and utilize a schedule of awards. Presumably this reflects
a wish to reduce the areas of controversy and to simplify procedures for
recovering compensation.
Analytically, the concept of a damage schedule might itself be viewed
as a third model which involves nothing more than striking averages for
categories of claims. On initial impression, scheduling would appear to
be neutral as to the level of damages-the schedule averages could in
theory be set at any level desired. But on further reflection it appears
that the use of scheduling almost invariably will result in lowering the
level of damages. The explanation lies in the problem of handling
dignitary harm. A decision to include a significant dignitary component
makes the scheduling of damages a complex task. Let us return again
to our victim who has lost a leg and consider the problem of scheduling
appropriate damages which will reflect the indignity to him. How many
distinctions would we wish to recognize? The difference between men
and women? Between adults and children? Between old and young?
Urban and rural? Athletic and sedentary? As we spin out these questions,
we become aware that in scheduling, one tends to decide against giving
any substantial weight to dignitary harm, without really confronting
the underlying policy issue. It is doubtful whether, compensation plans
apart, anyone would urge making this change in damage law for its own
sake.
Through scheduling we can develop a fourth and fifth model for
compensating victims which are more radical and more imaginative departures from the common law damage pattern. Our fourth model would
borrow directly from social insurance norms. The thesis is that the legal
system should provide not full compensation but, as with other welfare
measures, compensation at a minimum satisfactory subsistence level.8 7
Whereas the common law would seek to give the victim enough to bring
him back to whatever level he had been at before the accident, this
86 Compare -the policy argument urged in one of the earliest cases giving an explicit
justification for awarding damages for pain and suffering, Morse v. Auburn & Syracuse
R.R., 10 N.Y. 621 (1851).
87 For present purposes, we happily do not need a precise definition of this ambiguous and controversial standard.
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model would seek to give the victim only enough to cure the social
disaster of the injury88
At first thought the idea of treating the tort system as performing the
social welfare service of taking care of the needy seems full of promise,
but on reflection serious strains are disclosed. We must emphasize that
if we are to talk the idiom of social welfare we must be willing to accept
the consequence that the problem is then to be analyzed in a social
welfare framework and that this framework raises issues quite different
from those customary in tort law.
Any such approach must confront a difficulty common to all social
insurance proposals: In deciding on compensation for victims, are we to
look at the actual economic position of the individual victim, considering his own income and wealth and the other resources society makes
available to him? If the answer is yes, we presumably will decide not to
compensate from our fund those victims who are relatively well off or
who have adequate insurance protection from other sources. If the
answer is no, there is the old paradox of paying under a relief rationale
some victims who are not in need.
A more serious shortcoming is that such a welfare scheme confined
within the limits of the auto accident problem becomes absurdly ad hoc,
from the viewpoint both of the victims and of financing the plan. As to
the victims, it would involve singling out from the universe of the
needy those persons who happen to be in auto accidents. The needy man
who falls while crossing the street, to say nothing of the needy man who
suffers from disabling disease, would not be a beneficiary or concern of
the fund.
When we turn to the sources of financing for the welfare fund, the
picture becomes still more odd. The general logic we are pursuing here
is to assume that any additional coverage will be financed by a reallocation of damage awards among victims. In the subsistence model under
discussion, this means that payments for the needy victims of auto accidents would, in effect, be contributed by the victims of auto accidents
who would have had good claims under the common law and who are
not in need. The full artificiality of this reallocation is realized if we
think of financing the same welfare goals via taxation. Who would ever
propose taxing well-to-do victims of auto accidents in order to make
welfare payments to that fraction of the needy who happen to be victims
of auto accidents?
We can now voice the suspicion that the social problem of the victim,
which has generated the momentum for this model, is really the age old
88 Compare the Mexican death damage scheme described by Justice Holmes in Slater
v. Mexican National R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
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problem of poverty. The victim's claim to the government's attention
rests on being a needy case. If we were to make the magical assumption
that overnight the lower third in the wealth and income scale in our
society was brought substantially above a satisfactory subsistence level,
how much appeal would such a compensation plan have?89
In any event, the subsistence approach highlights how fascinatingly
different the rationale of the common law really is. Under the common
law the victims recover as a matter of right (because they were wronged)
and not as a case for public charity or assistance. Perhaps this is why no
one finds it congenial to argue for minimum subsistence compensation
to eligible victims under a fault system, or conversely to argue for full
compensation to all victims under a compensation plan. The common
law commitment to fault and to full compensation seem to go hand in
hand.
A fifth and last damage model is in effect the inverse of that just discussed. Applying the principle of major medical expense insurance,90
this model would leave all losses on victims up to a specified level; beyond
that level it would provide scheduled compensation for all auto accident
victims. The rationale for such an approach is that individuals might be
expected to absorb small losses without catastrophic consequences and
that a serious social problem emerges only when the loss is substantial.
The fund would be available to deal only with the serious social problems; but to avoid administrative difficulties, the system might ignore
other means at the disposal of the victims.
Instead of treating the uncompensated victims as an undifferentiated
mass, this approach, recently. explored by Clarence Morris and James
Paul, 91 seeks to focus on that aspect of the problem which is of greatest
concern to society. The approach, like the minimum subsistence model,
is sharply different from the common law in that the victim does not
claim as a matter of right (because he was wronged), but rather as a
case of a social problem. For the common law it is a matter of justice
between individuals; for both of these alternatives to the common law,
it is a matter of a proper solution to a social problem involving the
relationship between the victim and the state. The difference between
the minimum subsistence model and the major medical expense model
89 But the magic of the example may be unfair. The fact that poverty may be
viewed as a relative matter does not make it any less painful for those who experience
it.
90 Although there are comparable provisions in many accident insurance policies
today, we use this "nickname" because the major medical arrangement is more widely
known.
91 Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 913 (1962).
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is that the former sees the serious social problem as that of poverty,
while the latter sees it as that of a sudden catastrophe. On our view, both
social problems undoubtedly are serious to some extent today, but as
society grows more prosperous, the catastrophe element is likely to become relatively more significant and demanding than the poverty component. Moreover, the major medical expense model appears to be the
more appropriate one for dealing specifically with the automobile
accident problem. As we have pointed out, poverty is a general problem
of which the automobile accident is only a minor part; and for that
reason, if for no other, a compensation plan is not a particularly appropriate vehicle for dealing with poverty. In contrast, the major medical
expense model can be geared to dealing with extraordinary expenses or
costs arising in defined circumstances, and thus could be tailored to fit
the automobile accident situation. Not the least virtue of the major
medical model is that it allows for considerable flexibility in setting the
level of the threshold at which loss is shifted off the victims. Quite likely,
the deductible amount could be set high enough, without doing violence
to the rationale, to cover all victims and not put additional costs on
motorists. Such a model is ideal for dramatizing the issues for policy
debate.
It can now be seen that these various damage models have an interesting relationship to each other. Each, in contrast to the common law,
would finance new coverage by leaving part of the loss with the otherwise compensable victims. The bankruptcy model would leave a constant
fraction of the total loss on each victim; the "realistic damages" model
would leave the pain and suffering component of the loss fully on each
victim; the subsistence model would leave all of the loss above a minimum subsistence recovery level on the victim; the major medical expense
model would leave all the loss below a specified threshold level on the
victim. Further, each of these models operates on a different assumption
as to the function of compensation awards. The bankruptcy model builds
on the assumption that the size of the fund is controlling and that the
size of the fund depends on considerations which are independent of
the aggregate losses of the victims. The "realistic damages" model builds
on the assumption that all real losses, but only real losses, should be
compensated and that pain and suffering is not a real loss. The minimum
subsistence model builds on the assumption that the urgent function of
compensation is to prevent people from falling below a subsistence level
as a result of an auto accident. The major medical model builds on the
assumption that the urgent function of compensation is to cover the
catastrophic impact of the individual accident. Finally, all these models
are in contrast to the common law. Under it only some victims are
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eligible for awards; all eligible victims are entitled to be made whole
regardless of the total costs; being made whole includes a decent recognition of pain and suffering; and damages are to be computed individually for each case.
We thus reach the end of our exploration of the alternatives for
financing the additional coverage required by a plan through reallocating
awards. Constructing possible models is a useful exercise in that it serves
to locate refreshing questions about the theory and function of compensation. But the reallocation of damages as a method for financing a
plan remains unpersuasive. The case for it stumbles over two difficulties.
First, if the general level of damages is to be reduced, we have yet to
find sufficient reason for giving the benefits of the reduction to newly
covered victims instead of to motorist insureds. Second, if the total fund
contributed by motorists is to remain constant, we have yet to see why
the old victims should be forced to share it with the new victims.
7
A second major alternative for meeting the costs of additional coverage under a compensation plan is to posit an arrangement under which
the potential victims insure themselves against injury regardless of third
party fault. In theory damages could be measured as at common law;
but to avoid any distractions which may come from being so unrealistic,
we will assume that damages are to be fixed by schedule. By carrying
such insurance, the victims create a fund which would be available to
cover their losses. This arrangement would achieve the objective of
shifting the loss off the immediate victim. All victims would be covered
under it and they would shift their losses to the insurance fund.
It will be readily perceived that there are at least three lines of objection to this scheme. The first becomes evident when we translate it
back into common law terms. In effect, the scheme would be tantamount
to the abolition of all common law liability for auto accidents and substitution of a plan of compulsory accident insurance for victims. The
objection then goes to the old point that no one should be compelled
92
to pay premiums to insure against losses caused by the fault of another.
While we find this to be a congenial argument against the arrangement
offered, it need not detain us because the other objections are much
more powerful. A second line of objection derives from the traditional
presumption against sumptuary legislation. Everyone is already at liberty
to spend his resources for auto accident insurance, but it is difficult to
see why the state should intervene and compel him to do so. Although
92

See the discussion of recovery over, section 13 infra at 718.
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we would not reject out of hand all sumptuary legislation, we do urge
that there is some merit in calling a spade a spade. It is at this place that
an infrequently noticed detail of the Columbia plan becomes striking.
The draftsmen explicitly considered and rejected the desirability of
having their proposed compensation fund cover injuries in single car
accidents. Since there was agreement that a driver should always be
covered if he crashed into another car, it seemed odd not to protect him
where he crashed into a tree. The draftsmen nevertheless decided that
inclusion of the single car accident would change the basic rationale of
the plan and would raise serious constitutional doubts about it.93 They
recognized that such an extension of the plan would in effect call for
compelling each operator of an auto to insure himself against damage
in an accident in which no other auto operator was involved. The heart
of the matter was that it seemed anomalous to prevent a person from
driving unless he insured himself against damages he might sustain
from smashing into a tree. We call attention to the puzzle whether the
single car accident should be covered by a plan because it highlights
the awkwardness of creating a compensation fund that forces victims
to insure themselves.
A third line of objection to our first party insurance model is the
least theoretical and most decisive. It has often been observed that proponents of plans usually rely on financing a compensation fund through
use of liability insurance, and there has been a call to be more imaginative about the use of insurance. However, it is not habit alone which
keeps the plans tied to liability insurance. The main (if not only) alternative to liability insurance is accident insurance, and the difficulty in
using it is very basic: There is no practical way of enforcing a system of
compulsory auto accident insurance. Everyone in the society is a potential
auto accident victim and therefore the usual arrangement of making
insurance a license prerequisite is not available. Moreover, even if some
way could be found to solve the enforcement problem, the administrative
costs of selling insurance to the entire population would be prohibitive.
It would be uneconomic in the extreme to single out accidents from so
narrow a source and require that that risk alone be covered by a separate
insurance policy for each person or family unit.
These practical difficulties suggest that if compulsory accident insurance is thought desirable, a mechanism akin to taxation must be utilized
to collect the premiums. We thus come to the major alternative of
social insurance.
93 Dowling, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUm. L.
REv. 813 (1932); Lewis, The Merits of the Automobile Accident Compensation Plan, 3
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 583, 592 (1986).
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A feasible way of exploiting the social insurance alternative would be
to extend in some way the existing welfare legislation system to cover
auto accident injuries. It can be assumed for purposes of analysis that
this is done either at the state or the federal level. 94 It can also be
assumed for the present that the extension is to be financed by what is
virtually a flat tax on covered individuals, without contribution by
employers and without any contribution out of general tax revenues. 95
What we would have then is compulsory accident insurance financed by
"premiums" collected from the insureds by the government through its
tax mechanism.
The compelling analogy now comes from another quarter. Traditionally, compensation plans are treated as evolving from the common law
liability system; they are viewed as building upward from the common
law. The social security arrangement makes it readily apparent that we
can begin in a wholly different part of the legal map and come down
to the auto accident problem. The post-war development in England is
nicely illustrative. 96 In 1947 the Beveridge Report, based on the broadest
possible welfare rationale, recommended adoption of social insurance covering medical care and unemployment. At almost the last minute tort law
was remembered, and the question then arose whether there was any point
in keeping the tort law alive in view of the new social insurance scheme.
In typical English fashion, the conflict was not squarely resolved but
rather a compromise was adopted under which some fraction of the social
insurance benefits was to be deducted from common law damages. What
is important in this story for our purposes is that it shows how easy it is
to solve the auto accident problem without thinking about it specifically.
From the perspective of social insurance, the auto accident problem is
just one among many details of the total welfare issue.
The merits of solving the auto accident problem through social security cannot be appraised within the provincial borders of the traditional
tort viewpoint; they must be considered in the same terms as any other
extension of social security or welfare coverage. Every increase in social
insurance restricts the individual's freedom of choice in consumption.
At some level of social insurance coverage, any further limitation on the
individual surely must outweigh the gain from the increased insurance
protection. And at any level of social insurance coverage, a choice must
be made among the alternative types of coverage which can be compar94 The federalism aspect might pose a severe practical problem, but it is beyond
the special concerns of this essay.
95 See note 94 supra; a comparable comment applies here.
96 Friedman, Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63 HAv. L.
REv. 241 (1949).
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ably financed. In this context, auto accident injuries would compete with
illness, disease and misfortunes from other sources. The fact that the state
is already heavily involved in the administration of compensation for
auto accident injuries should not of itself give auto injuries a preferred
position in that competition. We find unpersuasive the argument that
the auto accident is to be preferred to cancer as an object for state welfare intervention simply because, due to the development of the common
law liability system, the state is already intervening in the one case and
97
not the other.
Nonetheless, the social security alternative is good enough to serve as
a challenge against which to measure any other proposed compensation
plan. The question it puts before the house is: If another plan is thought
to be good, why isn't the social security arrangement better?
Before leaving the compulsory accident insurance alternative, we must
deal with one other point which arguably will bring the auto accident
problem from the lofty reaches of social insurance philosophizing back
to the specific problem of auto accidents. Assume for the purposes of
analysis that we have a universe in which only auto drivers are ever injured by automobiles.98 If then we were to compel all motorists to carry
liability insurance to cover any damage .to others they cause by driving,
could it not be said that, whatever we may call this scheme, it functionally and realistically reduces to compulsory accident insurance? Since
there is a considerable overlap between drivers and victims of auto accidents, it might appear that on this view the Columbia plan has been
transformed into a workable compulsory auto accident insurance scheme
for the whole society. One thus might well be tempted to argue that the
most persuasive justification for an auto compensation plan may be that
it is the only practical way of approximating the goal of compulsory accident insurance without opening up the larger issues inherent in any
use of social insurance. And, if so, we appear to reach the perplexity that
there is really nothing left to debate as to coverage of victims since all
plans, including the common law with compulsory liability insurance,
lead to de facto accident insurance schemes.
But the real world is not quite so tidy. The overlap between drivers
and victims is far from perfect and it is imperfect enough to leave a substantial number of victims who will be covered by the plan although they
97 But compare James, supra note 76, at 415: "And the objection to singling out the
automobile approaches the trivial. The automobile accident has singled itself out, as
its frequency and economic consequences plainly show ... A good case can be made
for a much broader type of social insurance, perhaps covering all disabilities from
accident or illness. But those who raise the present objection would be the last to

espouse anything like that."
98 Note, Absolute Liability for Dangerous Things, 61 HARv. L. REv. 515 (1948).
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will not have contributed to the fund. In brief, the motorist who asks why
he is being compelled to contribute to the fund for compensating a pedestrian who does not drive in all likelihood will not be reassured by
the answer that in effect he is only insuring himself. Moreover, the degree
of overlap between drivers and victims in any given time period will not
be constant, but will be contingent on various factors such as the age
distribution of the population and relative prosperity of the country.
And further, there is still a crucial difference between accident insurance
and liability insurance when one comes to appraise risks for the purpose
of differentiating among insureds in setting premiums. The relevant criterion for rating risks in the case of liability insurance is the propensity
of the owner, or those who use his car, to cause accidents; the relevant criterion for rating risks in the case of accident insurance is the propensity
of the victim to get hurt. If one believes that the accurate grading of premiums is an important policy consideration in any insurance scheme,
then a liability insurance system cannot be made to function like a true
accident insurance system.
We cannot resist another comment. If a latent preference for compulsory auto accident insurance is behind the support for compensation
plans, it would at least be a great improvement in candor to have this
value made explicit.
8
One of the most persistent arguments advanced in behalf of compensation plans is that adoption of a plan would yield sufficient economies
to make the coverage for additional victims virtually costless. The contention turns on a very simple thought. The subtlety of the fault criterion and the cumbersomeness of the jury system appear to make the cost
of administering the present law very high. It is asserted that the streamlined procedures and rules of compensation plans would make possible
a marked reduction in these costs. This savings, it is argued, would be
sufficient to pay for the cost of the additional coverage prescribed by the
plan.99
At the outset it will be helpful to define what is meant by the costs of
administering either the present system or any compensation plan. For
this purpose, the definition has to be somewhat artificial since we are not
dealing with measurements which fit within the familiar analysis of accountants or economists. The most useful definition of these costs has two
components: (1) the expenses incurred in transferring compensation dollars to claimants and (2) the compensation dollars paid in satisfaction of
99 See, e.g., Morris, The Insurance Principle: Compulsory Insurance in CONFERENCE
ON INSURANCE (University of Chicago Law School Conference Series No. 14, 1954).
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fraudulent claims. Both components are relevant to the current controversy over plans. Proponents of plans argue that their systems will be
less costly than the common law in that plans will transfer a given number of compensation dollars to claimants with the expenditure of a
smaller total number of dollars for expenses. 100 Opponents of plans argue
that a plan will be more vulnerable to fraudulent claims-admittedly a
somewhat subjective concept. The full argument for a compensation plan
based on its internal economies is that, as compared to the present system,
the savings on transfer costs will greatly outweigh any loss from an increase in fraudulent claims.
We turn to consider the impact of a plan on fraudulent claims. 101 The
auto plans do not have anything comparable to the built-in protection
surrounding the usual industrial accident covered by workmen's compensation. In the case of the auto accident, witnesses are likely to be more
transient, the relationship between the parties is likely to be that of total
strangers, and the post-accident evidence is likely to be more elusive. The
upshot is that, on the average, it is appreciably more difficult to investigate
and determine the legitimacy of the claim in the case of the auto accident
than in the case of the industrial accident. The important question here,
however, is whether an auto plan will offer a greater inducement to fraudulent claims than the present common law arrangement. Presumably no
one is equipped to answer this question with any assurance, but several
conjectures might be advanced. It is in the area of the relatively small
auto accident claim that fraud today appears to be most prevalent. One
might argue that some plans would produce an increase in small claims
and by this route an increase in fraud. It might also be argued that because of the change in the basis of liability the opportunities for defeating claims would be substantially lessened under a plan. Insurance carriers' 02 consequently might become less active in defending against small
claims under a plan, and it is conceivable that a reduced degree of investigation would both encourage the filing of false claims and hinder the
detection of frauds. Gutting the other way is the fact that much of the
fraud today seems to be associated with the need for establishing the negligence of the driver and the absence of negligence on the part of the victim in order to recover. Under a plan the inducement for such fraud will
have been eliminated, in much the fashion that the standard deduction
100 For a comparative analysis of the operating costs of making payments under
various benefit systems, including the common law, see Bombaugh, The Economic
Significance of Loss Shifting in the United States, 28 J. INS. 13 (1961).
101 James, supra note 76, at 419-20; Lilly, supra note 60; Sherman, Grounds for
Opposing the Automobile Accident Compensation Plan, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 598.
102 Or public officials under the social security model.
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in the income tax has lowered the over-all chances for fraud with respect
1 03
to small itemized deductions.
Our own conclusion from these conjectures is that, although it is possible that the incidence of fraud would increase under a plan, it is unlikely that the fraud loss would bulk large enough to produce a significant change in costs. Accordingly, we shall simplify our discussion of
comparative costs by foregoing further concern with the incidence of
fraud.
Putting fraud to one side, the crucial question for internal economies
is to what extent will a plan reduce the transfer costs that are present in
the current system. The relevant comparison is between the total private
and official costs of processing all claims for compensation today (whether
or not they are in the end paid) and the total private and official costs
that would arise under a compensation plan in processing this same universe of claims. It is not relevant for present purposes that under a plan
additional claims would be filed and compensated because of the expanded coverage. The question is simply whether the plan will succeed
in handling more cheaply the claims that are now processed.104
It has been contended that a plan would produce such economies because the changes it would make in substantive rules as to liability and
damages would significantly reduce the area, intensity and complexity of
controversy. The argument is that there would be appreciably less need
for official adjudications and for the utilization of experts and their auxiliaries in the settlement process and in the litigation of claims. A savings
in official costs would follow in that there would be need for fewer judges,
fewer juries, fewer courtrooms and fewer functionaries; and a savings in
103 When the income tax became a mass tax in the early forties, it proved very
difficult to police the small claims for deductions which taxpayers were required to
itemize. In part to eliminate the "fraud" problem, the law was modified to allow a
limited automatic deduction to all taxpayers whether or not they were in a position
otherwise to claim specific deductions.
104 A simple numerical example may perhaps be helpful here. Assume that under
the common law we have a community which averages 1000 accidents a year and that
600 of these are compensable. Assume further that on the average $500 in damages
are paid on each claim and that the processing of claims "costs" $150 per claim.
If under a shift to a plan these costs are reduced from $150 per claim to $50, there
will be a savings of $100 X 600 = $60,000 in the sense that the plan will do what the
common law system is doing-namely, processing these 600 accident claims-and will
do it more economically.
Further, this economy will be operative even though the shift to a plan will add 400
newly eligible claims.
Under the common law a fund of 600 X $500 or $300,000 was required to give each
of 600 claimants a $500 -$150 = $350 net award. Under a plan, 1000 X $400 or
$400,000 is required to give each of 1000 claimants a $400 -$50 = $350 net award.
The increased cost of the plan, $100,000, reflects both the economy in handling claims
and the added cost of additional coverage.
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private costs would follow in that lawyers and other professional personnel would be needed on fewer occasions and their work would command lower fees.
We can grant that the ratio of claims settled to claims litigated is likely
to increase under a plan, especially if the plan provides a relatively low
ceiling on damages. One must, however, be cautious in assessing the consequences of such a change. The settlement ratio is already extremely
high-approaching ninety-seven percent for all claims-so that the latitude for savings through this route is rather narrow. 105 There is further
the disturbing note that workmen's compensation, which a half century
ago offered a comparable promise of holding litigation down to a negligible level, has continued to provide fertile ground for adjudicated controversy. It should also be emphasized that some of the potential savings
in official costs are illusory in that we have already paid for the courtrooms, and the judges and functionaries are already on the public payroll and are likely to remain there. And whatever the savings in official
costs, there is little likelihood that their magnitude can make much of
an impact since the total of such costs attributable to auto accident cases
can only be a very small fraction of the total compensation payments
made each year as a result of injuries from autos. 106
The main avenue for achieving a savings in cost is through reduction
in the use of the services of experts (and auxiliary personnel) and in the
compensation paid for their services. The measure of the savings, as we
see it, can perhaps best be explored by centering on the role of lawyers
in the compensation process, keeping in mind that investigators, claims
agents and other talents are also necessarily involved.
It is often assumed that under a plan the law will become so much
clearer and simpler that many more claims will not only stay out of litigation but will be settled by the parties without the intervention of lawyers. We are not that sanguine. 107 There is little basis in experience to
justify the prediction. The fact is that in the aggregate we are dealing
with transfers of large sums of money, and no matter how much the law
is simplified there will always remain an irreducible amount of ambiguity
in the rules, as well as doubts as to the facts in particular cases. As long
as any disagreements remain, with a dollar value attached to their reso& BUCHHOLZ, DELAY iN THE COURT pt. III (1959).
106 A boundary figure is provided in the careful estimate that $200,000,000 a year
changes hands as a result of personal injury accidents in New York City. Franklin,
Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal
Injury Litigation, 61 COLUm. L. Rv. 1, 14 (1961).
107 For a vigorous defense of the role of the lawyer in processing workmen's compensation claims, see Marcus, Advocating the Rights of the Injured, 61 Mica. L. REV.
921 (1963).
105 ZEISEL, KALVEN
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lution, we can expect that the process of disposing of claims will not be
automatic or effortless. In operating a plan, moreover, a high degree of
expertise is bound to develop on the side of the fund, the administration
of which inevitably will take on all the characteristics of a large bureaucracy. Most claimants are likely to perceive the need for equally qualified
experts to represent them in negotiations. Thus on both sides there will
be a demand for expert services which cannot be wholly eliminated.
There will be situations, to be sure, under a plan where individual claimants will attempt to perform this service function on their own behalf
where they would not do so today. Even in these instances, however,
there is a danger of overstating the reduction in costs. While it is true
that a claimant would then not have to pay for the services of an expert,
it is equally true that he incurs the cost of his own services. The perception of this as a cost is not just a nicety of the economist; the claimant is
investing his own time, and in many cases it would be more economic for
him to pay for an expert and to use his own time otherwise. All things
considered, it is extremely improbable that the compensation system can
be simplified to such an extent that virtually no time or effort would be
involved in obtaining payment of claims.
Further, we should not rush to applaud the apparent enthusiasm here
for killing off the lawyers. We suggest that in a substantial number of
cases, even where the value of the claimant's time is a matter of indifference, he will be financially better off with good legal representation.
Everything in our experience strongly indicates that the lawyer frequently is an economically valuable component of the negotiating process in the simple sense that the results are different when he participates.
For a compensation plan to work as intended, the adversary balance contributed by the lawyer will often be needed.
In spite of our reservations, it must be admitted that no one can predict with confidence what the new patterns of behavior in processing
claims would be like under a plan. New customs, departing from strictly
economic behavior, might easily develop. Our semi-educated guess is that
the services of lawyers would continue in fairly heavy demand. Experience with workmen's compensation, although not precisely analogous,
heavily underscores this conclusion.
It may also be contended by the proponents of plans that a major part
of the reduction in lawyer costs would be in the form of a price reduction. Lawyers, in brief, would charge less under a plan than under present conditions. Because settlements are so large a fraction of dispositions
today, and presumably would be even larger under a plan, the main
point for inquiry is not whether lawyers would charge less for trying cases
than they do today but whether they would charge less for presenting and
settling claims than they do today.
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In tracing out whether lawyers would charge less, some elementary
economic notions are relevant. If they charge less under a plan, it must
either be due to voluntary choice or because fees are regulated. Absent
government regulations, the explanation of lower fees under a plan must
be either that lawyers feel a moral obligation to charge less or that market forces are altered. Both explanations must ultimately rest on the
point that the challenge confronting the lawyer in auto claims has been
greatly simplified by the plan.1 08 It does not appear to us fruitful to explore the morality of the voluntary fee setting process; we see no reason
why the lawyer in our society should not be governed by the dictates of
the market in setting fees, and in passing we cannot resist observing that
adherence to market criteria would result in the most economic allocation
of legal talent among alternative uses. Thus the issue is reduced to
whether the changes made by a plan would alter market conditions for
the supply and demand of legal services in connection with compensation claims. We have already concluded that while the demand for such
services might be diminished, the reduction is not likely to be major. If
the price of legal services is to be drastically changed through market
forces, it must be because of alterations on the supply side. The argument
that change will occur is that the operation of a plan would call for less
skill on the part of lawyers in handling claims and therefore more lawyers would possess the degree of skill needed to compete for this type of
business. This line of analysis is plausible as far as it goes, but we must
remember that we understand little about the economic structure of the
personal injury bar today. It is hard to see that scarcity of roughly comparable talent alone accounts for the notably high remuneration received
by the top tort lawyers.
More likely, what the proponents of plans have had in mind regarding lower fees is much simpler-the plan would by government decree
fix fee levels. No doubt such regulation could have the effect of reducing
fees in compensation cases, although in the long run it might also have
repercussions on how legal talent was allocated between compensation
claims and demands for legal services that are unregulated. But what is
of immediate interest is this question: What is there about a plan which
justifies making a particular change we apparently would not make absent a plan? Specifically, in what way does a plan justify fixing fees? Insofar as the impetus for regulation comes from a feeling that lawyers now
charge too much, all that can be said is that the plan is being used as an
occasion to precipitate a change which otherwise would be difficult to
bring about. Nor is it sound to urge that under a plan fees should be
108 And, of course, the contingency of liability has been eliminated.
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regulated because the lawyer would no longer be performing as valuable
a service. While this contention might form a basis for criticising the bar
if it charged the same fees under a plan as before, it cannot explain why
we are unwilling to rely on the market to set fee levels under a plan
whereas we are willing in general to trust the market under present conditions.
In any event, some perspective on the magnitudes involved here is
needed. We have already noted that the potential savings in official costs
is relatively trivial. Lawyers' fees for claimants appear to run about a
third of the total settlements. 109 Making the most favorable assumption
that fees would be controlled and limited to half that fraction, such regulation could produce a reduction in charges equal roughly to fifteen percent of total payments on claims. The potential for financing additional
coverage via this route can be no greater.
It is important to make explicit here the steps by which these savings
in private costs, unlike any savings in official costs, are thought to become
available to finance additional coverage. In simplest form the contention
is as follows: Of the gross awards today under the common law, about
two-thirds is taken home by claimants and the balance goes to pay for
fees and other private costs. It is assumed that by simplifying the whole
process, a compensation plan will bring about a 50% reduction in fees
and other private costs. If the award level under a plan is lowered by the
equivalent of this 50% reduction, claimants on the average would receive
the same take-home awards as before, and hence as a class would not
suffer as a result of the shift to a plan. If the money that previously went
into the higher lawyers' fees and other private costs were used to provide
coverage for additional victims, motorists would not be called upon to
pay in the aggregate any more than under the common law, and hence
also would not be any worse off under the plan. In brief, this approach
to a plan provides additional coverage for victims at no extra cost to anyone, except possibly the lawyers.
It remains to examine the assumption that the savings in private costs
should be devoted to financing coverage for additional victims. We previously questioned the logic of giving the benefits of lower awards to a
new class of victims instead of to motorists. Similarly, should not the savings in private costs be used to reduce the costs borne by motorists or, if
not, should not the savings at least be used to increase the take-home
awards of the victims who recover at common law? On first impression,
the use of the savings to finance additional coverage seems like an un109 Franklin, Chanin &Mark, supra note 106, at 21. For all cases in New York City
in 1957, the average fee was 36%.
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justifiable step. To borrow from an illustration we introduced earlier, 110
let us assume that road maintenance has been financed by a special tax
on gasoline. An innovation in technology cuts in half the cost of maintenance. The question is whether these savings should be available for
other public purposes, such as the maintenance of schools, or whether
in justice the benefits should accrue to those who pay the special gasoline
tax. To restate our prior conclusion, it seems pretty clear that tax reduction is the appropriate solution. Does this analogy hold for the savings in
costs expected from internal economies in changing to a compensation
plan?
The answer is somewhat striking. There seems to be no way of giving
these savings to motorists in lieu of having a plan, because on hypothesis
the savings in costs cannot be had in the absence of a plan. There is a
comparable difficulty in passing the savings on to the victims who would
have recovered at common law, so as to increase their take-home awards.
These savings, again on hypothesis, are realized only if there is a plan,
and in this context the assumption is that there will be a plan only because these savings are available to finance it.
Thus the internal economies approach furnishes a strong argument for
extending the coverage as required by a compensation plan, provided
only that the magnitude of the savings is great enough to finance the additional coverage and that there is no new offsetting factor which might
erase the savings.
Whatever the range of plausible estimates might be, there will be one
offsetting factor which casts a long shadow over the hope that there will
be sufficient net savings to finance the additional coverage. A favorite
argument of insurance industry spokesmen is that a plan will result in
a radical increase in claims consciousness. It is necessary to trace through
this challenge with some care.
As a first step we should distinguish between an increase in claims
consciousness and an increase in fraud. We have already dealt with
the impact of plans on fraud. Our concern here is with any increase in the propensity to file non-fraudulent claims. It is also
important not to confuse the point under consideration with the
increase in coverage, and hence the addition of claims by newly covered
victims, that will be a chief feature of any plan. Speaking precisely, an
increase in claims consciousness refers to a shift in the attitude of accident
victims with respect to their willingness to bear marginal or trivial or
doubtful (but not fraudulent) losses themselves, rather than attempt to
shift such losses by filing claims. One might expect that there would be
110 See section 3 supra.
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a stable propensity to file claims whenever possible. However, there is
striking evidence that the ratio of claims filed for personal injuries varies
markedly over different parts of the country."' These findings suggest
strongly that the filing of claims is influenced by subtle cultural or psychological forces, and therefore that a large-scale change in institutions
and legal rules might well alter the existing claims ratio.
A variety of factors may affect the claims ratio: (1) the ease of pursuing
a claim; (2) the estimate of the actual likelihood of official scrutiny; (3)
the degree of organized exploiting or stimulating of claims; and (4) the
community mores with respect to the propriety of victims absorbing marginal losses themselves. Avowedly we have no empirical studies on
how a plan would affect these four factors, but it would appear that
under most plans all four are likely to change in a direction which
increases the filing of claims. The costs of pursuing a claim must have
some direct relationship to whether it is filed, and these costs, which include not only the fees for services of expert intermediaries but also the
personal costs of engaging in controversy, will presumably go down. The
difficulties of official scrutiny will increase as the volume of claims, particularly small ones, increases and this difficulty is likely to be perceived
widely by the community, thus acting as an invitation to file claims. As
the settlement of claims becomes easier, more persons may be tempted
to engage in soliciting them, with the likelihood that fewer marginal
claims will escape notice. And finally, and perhaps most important, the
whole tone of the society with respect to the decencies of shifting losses
off oneself is likely to change. If the plan has been promoted in terms of
compensating all who are injured-that is, as awarding something to
which a man is entitled simply because he is a victim-we may expect
a diminution in reticence to pursue a small or an ambiguous claim.
We would conclude that it is most probable that the introduction of
a plan would bring with it a marked increase in claims consciousness.
What follows from this?
We should first note that the expansibility of the claims universe is
only a short-run phenomenon. During the transitional years, it is likely
to be extremely difficult to predict the total level of claims on the basis
of any prior experience. Understandably this would complicate the problems of the insurance industry in pricing and marketing coverage. At the
end of the transition period, however, a new equilibrium would be
reached because the factors which initially stimulated an increase in
claims consciousness would presumably remain constant once the plan
had been adopted. The new degree of claims consciousness would provide
111

ZEisEL, KALvEN & BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE CouRT ch. 20 (1959).
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a reasonably secure base to the insurance industry for projecting the
higher future level of claims.
It is precisely because this new equilibrium is likely to be at a higher
level that there well may be an offset to the savings from internal economies of a plan. As we have seen, a compensation plan might be able to
make more funds available for payment of claims by handling any given
number of claims more economically than the common law would handle
them. The savings can only be had by adopting a plan. But we now see
that the very adoption of a plan would not only add new claimants because of the expanded coverage, but would enlarge the number of claims
filed because of an increase in claims consciousness. It is obvious that the
monies needed to satisfy the claims arising from an increase in claims
consciousness would pro tanto not be available to finance the new coverage sought by the plan. Thus the very change to a plan which produces
economies in handling claims is likely to produce a stimulus for proliferating claims. While no estimates of the magnitudes are available,1 1 2 it is
conceivable that a compensation plan would have to run faster to stay
in the same place." 3
The difficulty, then, with this approach to a compensation plan is that
it asks us to balance one conjecture against another.
There is a concluding observation which is common to both the internal economies approach to financing a plan and the approach via reallocating damages among victims. Both have, as a characteristic feature,
the promise that the additional coverage will be financed without imposing additional costs on motorists. We can look upon this as a kind of
bargain with motorists under which they would trade their liability at
common law for their strict but limited liability under the plan. If this
rhetoric of a bargain is to be treated as an important part of the rationale
for a plan, it becomes relevant to ask whether the bargain can be kept.
The bargain envisages collecting a fund on the basis of going insurance
rates and using the size of the fund as a yardstick to fix the magnitude
of benefits. One need not be a total skeptic to conclude that such a bargain might be difficult to maintain. In practice, it likely will turn out that
over time, the magnitude of the benefits will be redetermined and that
costs then will be reassessed so as to finance the new level of payouts.
112 In New York City the maximum increase in claims would be 13%, given the
estimate that only 13% of accidents are not followed by claims. HUNTING & NEUWIRrH,
WHO SuEs IN NEW YoRK CrrY (1962). New York City, however, is a very claims conscious
area. ZEIsEL, KALVEN & BucsmoLz, DELAY IN Tr COURT ch. 20 (1959).
113 Claims awareness, it can well be argued, is not necessarily bad. On this view, the
point would simply be that the costs of "properly" compensating for auto accidents are
larger than we would anticipate on the basis of experience under the common law
system.
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After a few years it will become impossible to reconstruct the baseline,
and thus all traces of the original terms of the bargain will have been
lost. In the end a large part of the increased burden is likely to be put
on motorists, with the change occurring under circumstances that foreclose discussion of the policy which is involved.
9
We now reach a fourth and last stage in our analysis of alternative
ways of handling the cost of additional coverage in compensation plans.
The three alternatives examined so far have had in common that no new
costs would be charged to owners or operators of vehicles; rather, additional coverage was to be financed either by having the victims insure
themselves, or by redistributing awards among victims, or by effectuating
internal economies in administering claims. Yet the most common way of
thinking about plans has been to assume that increased coverage is at
least in part to be financed by motorists. 14 Often the policy issue that
would be posed by adding costs on motorists is passed over by arguing
that this issue is premature until we know how much the plan will cost
after it has actually been in operation. We believe that the issue can be
posed sharply without knowing how much the plan will cost. The policy
question is: If the expanded coverage in operation will cost more than
the present system, what justification is there for placing such additional
costs on those who own or operate vehicles?
It is worth recalling the obvious here concerning the common law. The
ready answer of the common law is that whatever costs are attributable
to the negligence of motorists should be placed on them absent contributory negligence on the part of victims. This answer is, by definition, not
available in the case of plans, which reject fault as the exclusive criterion
for shifting accident losses. The critical question thus can be restated:
What criterion other than fault can justify putting the cost of additional
coverage on motorists?
In recent years the fashionable response has been that one should look
to economic analysis. 11 5 We here reach an appropriate place to ask: What
can economic theory contribute to the development of liability theory?
The formula which the academic commentator appears to have borrowed
from the economist is that the loss should be placed on the superior risk
114 See, for example, the Columbia Plan, supra note 6; the Ehrenzweig Plan, supra
note 9; and the Green Plan, supra note 13.
115 EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); James, Accident
Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948);
Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HAv. L. Rzv. 401 (1959); Morris,
Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952).
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bearer. It has frequently been noted that this is a phrase which is rich in
ambiguity, and we suspect it might well be disowned by the economist.
But for present purposes at least three meanings-two minor and one
major-can be isolated and examined in the context of compensation
plans.
The bluntest version, which echoes early discussion of vicarious liability doctrines, is that the loss should be placed on the party with the
"deepest pocket."" 6 Whatever the merits of the deep pocket view generally, there are some special difficulties with it as applied to auto accidents. Motorists, the argument runs, should pay for accident losses because as a class they are wealthier than victims as a class. In our society
most automobiles belong to individuals and not to business organizations.
While early in the auto era, and especially in the horse and buggy days,
the average vehicle owner was surely wealthier than the average victim,
there is reason to doubt that this proposition is meaningfully true today.
Certainly it must be true that many victims are wealthier than many motorists, and certainly there must be wide variations in wealth both among
motorists and among victims. We are therefore reduced to dealing with
averages of some kind. Even if such averages were available to us, there
would be the question of how big a difference in the averages is significant for deep pocket purposes. And the argument is further embarrassed
by the considerable overlap between those who drive cars and those who
are auto accident victims. 117
But let us assume for the sake of argument that there is a significant
difference between the two groups-that only drivers of solid gold Cadillacs ever injure people and that only those in the bottom fourth of the
income scale are ever victims. Would the deep pocket argument then be
persuasive? The appeal of the principle is that it redistributes wealth or
income so as to reduce economic inequalities. As a method of redistribution, however, it confronts several difficulties. Redistribution from motorists to victims necessarily will act like a regressive tax among motorists.
Not all owners of solid gold Cadillacs will have identical amounts of income or wealth, and if each is required to pay the same premium for compensation insurance every year, there will be not only a redistribution
from the very rich to the very poor but also a redistribution from the
less wealthy to the more wealthy. A solid gold Cadillac, in brief, is an
116 BATY, Vic.Rious LIABILrrY 154 (1916); Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige-A Comparative Study, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 445 (1950).

The famous Baty phrase is followed by these two sentences: "The present is not a
very propitious time for withstanding a dogma based on such a principle. But a return
to simpler manners will probably bring with it a return to saner views of liability, even
if it is not sooner recognized that to injure capital is to injure industry."
117 See section 7 supra.
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unnecessarily imprecise index of wealth or income. The whole venture
would be somewhat reminiscent of the old English tax predicated on the
number of windows in one's dwelling.
We need not belabor the point. While a progressive general tax on income, wealth or expenditure can redistribute income or wealth among
individuals or families in a meaningful, if uneasy, manner, car ownership
or ownership of other specific assets is not likely to be a satisfactory substitute. A general tax system can implement systematic decisions about
the inequalities of income or wealth in society. If, however, every price
in the society were set with an eye to the wealth or income of users, the
result could only be chaotic. The fallacy of the deep pocket approach in
this context is an old one: It is not feasible for the law adequately to
solve problems of distributive justice when dealing with problems of corrective justice.
The second meaning of the superior risk bearer formula is less crude
but hardly more helpful. The idea is that whoever has superior access to
insurance is the superior risk bearer."18 This concept of superior riskbearing was developed primarily to throw light on judge-made common
law rules. In that context it sometimes made sense for the court to look
to the insurance habits and customs of the community and then to devise
a rule of liability that best reflected them. However, when we move to
the level of legislative decision, these guide lines lose their significance.
The relevant question becomes: Who should be compelled to carry the
insurance? While a court, in justifying its liability rule, cannot dictate
new patterns of insuring but can consider only existing habits, the legislature has great latitude in dictating what "customs" it wants to establish
as to the carrying of insurance."19
It is an undoubted fact that the custom of carrying liability insurance
is much wider among motorists than is the custom of carrying accident
insurance among victims. What support does this offer, at the level of
legislative discretion, for putting additional costs on motorists? It is shortsighted to look only at current insurance habits. We must recall again
that it is the public at large that constitutes the universe of potential victims and there is nothing that prevents the legislature from in effect compelling nearly everyone to carry accident insurance through extension of
the social security system. The real question then becomes: With respect
to access to insurance, are motorists as a class superior risk bearers to the
118 Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige-A Comparative Study, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
445 (1950); Morris, HazardousEnterprisesand Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172

(1952).
119 See
634-41.

generally GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES ON TORTS ch. 10 (1959), and especially
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tax paying public? The very existence of social security indicates that
the answer is obviously no.
The third-and surely the most important-meaning of the superior
risk bearer formula is that enterprises should pay their own way. Beginning with the celebrated analyses of vicarious liability a generation ago,
a whole series of legal problems have been re-analyzed from this perspective. 20 Under this approach those interested in law in effect turn to the
economist for advice in the expectation that the economist's analyses regarding the allocation of costs will aid the law in reaching determinations
on the allocation of liability. As far as we can tell, many in the legal
world have thought that the concept of an enterprise paying its own way
offers a sufficient bridge into the world of economics.' 21 They hear the
economist talking about proper and improper allocation of costs and
understand him as saying that an improper allocation of costs leads to an
uneconomic and impolitic result. The lawyer's expectation is that by
translating the liability issue into a question of costs, he can draw on the
expertise of the economist to reach a proper allocation of these costs.
But if the economist is patient and candid, the lawyer will find his
great expectations shaken. The economist will point out that the allocation of costs is not a matter of giving a description of the facts of the
economic order, as the lawman seems to have thought. Rather the allocation of costs is always avowedly instrumental. Only if we specify the
goals can the economist tell us what is the proper allocation of costs.
But the possibility of getting help from the economist does not end so
abruptly. The lawyer may well find congenial two goals which are commonly found in the writings of economists: (1) It is desirable to arrange
matters so that as many decisions as possible about the use of resources
are made responsive to realistic voting by the consumers of goods and
services; (2) in satisfying the votes of consumers, given the existing distribution of wealth and income, it is desirable to maximize output
through achieving the most efficient combinations of resources. Using
these goals, the economist is now able to say something significant about
allocating costs. It is desirable to have consumers confront as realistically
as possible the costs of activities in choosing among alternatives. And it
is preferable to place costs strategically on those whose decisions can affect the magnitude of the costs. The first injunction will tend to make
120 See, e.g., Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J.
584, 720 (1929); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916); Seavey,

Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," in

HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS

433 (1934); Smith,

Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUm. L. REv. 444, 716 (1923); Steffen, Independent Contractor
and the Good Life, 2 U. CH. L. RFv. 501 (1935).
121 Cf. Smith, supra note 120.
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the allocation of resources in the society conform to the free choice of the
members expressed through the market. The second injunction will tend
to hold down waste and maximize efficiency in producing the goods and
122
services for which the consumers have voted.
Assuming that we accept these twin goals as stating an attractive public
policy, what advice can the economist now give us about resolving liability issues? To convey an adequate sense of the framework for economic
analysis, it will be convenient to pause and consider liability problems
somewhat more generously and not limit ourselves to the auto accident
situation. Avowedly we will be exploring the matter in greater detail
than is required by our specific topic. The justification, if one is needed,
is that the idiom of economic analysis has been widely imported into
legal literature in what now strikes us as being an incomplete and confusing way.
The world of liability is concerned with injury to persons and property. 123 There should be little difficulty in seeing that such injuries destroy or impair scarce resources and are therefore costs. Looking at these
costs through the economist's eyes, a key distinction for the law and for
theories of enterprise liability emerges. The distinction might be best
approached by a -simple example. Let us suppose that a certain radioactive material on the face of a wristwatch dial causes skin damage to
some persons who wear the watch. The important characteristics of this
situation are that users of the watch acquired the product in voluntary
market transactions with the manufacturer and that only users of the
watch are exposed to the harm. Thus the universe of consumer voters
and the universe of potential victims coincide.
In this situation the economist can add a major insight to what the
lawyer might normally perceive about the relationships involved. If the
law imposes liability for the harm from the watch dials on the manufacturer, that cost ultimately will be reflected in the price of the watches
and hence the cost will be borne by the consumers of the product. Legal
writing in recent years has picked up this point and often takes the position that, whenever possible, liability costs should be placed on an indus122 We are asserting that in our use of economic analysis in this section, nothing
turns on whether ar industry is highly competitive or monopolistic. See Calabresi, supra
note 115.
It should be emphasized that we are concerned only with long-run analysis. We are
ignoring the economic consequences which might occur in the short-run if the society
were to move from one liability rule to another.
'23 For reasons of simplicity we have omitted explicit discussion of damages to
property. While the Columbia Plan did not cover property claims, we are assuming
that the various models of plans .under discussion could be extended to cover injury
to property without changing any essential features of the analysis.
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try in order to achieve such wide distribution of loss. This, however, is
only half the story as the economist tells it. If the law does not impose
liability on the manufacturer of the watches but leaves it on the consumers, the result would again be that consumers as a class bear the loss. The
risk of harm from using the watch, it may be assumed, will be known to
users and they will regard it as part of the cost of the product. Therefore
whether liability is placed on the industry or the loss is left with consumers, the economy will be equally responsive to consumer voting and
consumers as a class will cast the same vote. The law's choice of liability
rules thus would seem to have no impact on the allocation of resources
in the society. To the economist, the choice of legal rule for this situation
might seem prima facie to be a matter of indifference.
On further analysis this is not quite the case. But the difference in
consequences is not what the lawyer might have expected. Placing liability on the industry is tantamount to compelling the consumers to buy
insurance against the loss through paying a higher price. The outcome
would be that each user would purchase not only the product but also
insurance against harm from the product, in much the same way that
today he frequently is forced to purchase "free" trading stamps. This
obviously is a sure method for bringing about total insurance coverage
against the harm for all purchasers of the product. For a variety of reasons it can be argued that the coverage would not be the same if the law
were to leave the loss with consumers. As a practical matter, accident insurance may not be available for so narrowly defined a risk; the consumers may perceive the risk of harm differently than does the industry; and
many consumers may deliberately elect not to insure themselves. But such
differences in insurance coverage need not lead us to the conclusion that
it is better policy for the law to place the cost on the industry. For one
thing, this automatic form of compulsory insurance in effect provides
every consumer with the same coverage at the same price. It therefore
cannot adjust adequately to the differing insurance needs of individual
consumers of the product, with the result that some will overpay and
others will underpay for protection. 124 And, more important, like any
form of compulsory insurance, it deprives the consumer of his own choice
125
as to whether he wishes to carry insurance.
While considerably more could be said about the competing considerations in this situation, what is arresting for us is that the whole issue
turns on the merits of compulsory accident insurance. The statement of
124 In theory at least, numerous personal factors might affect sharply the rational
need for such accident insurance. Age is a good example.
125 The fact that the consumer cannot buy the product without buying "the insurance" may itself have an impact on the allocation of resources in the society.
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the policy issue now has an unfamiliar ring.126 In the end the argument
for strict liability turns out to be that it provides the most strategic
method for compelling accident insurance.
Having stayed with the economist this far, and perhaps having been
reassured by learning that so little depends on the choice of liability
rules, we come back to the problem of auto accidents. Does the same
analysis hold? If it is thought to be a good idea to place the cost of radium dial injuries on the industry to spread losses, is it not an equally
good idea to place the cost of auto accidents on car manufacturers or
motorists?
The economist will tell us that here the choice of liability rule may
entail consequences of a different order. In his scheme of things, the injuries caused by autos and the radium dial injuries involve intrinsically
different situations. Unlike our watch illustration, the risk of harm from
autos is not confined to those who buy and drive cars, but includes also
those who are strangers to the marketing and use of autos. Insofar as this
is true, the cost of auto accidents will not inescapably be borne by motorists through the voluntary act of purchasing or driving a car. The upshot is that under the economist's value system it will make a difference
where the law places the loss. If placed on motorists, the loss becomes a
cost of driving. If left on victims, the loss is what the economist might call
an "externality" to the auto industry-a cost to society but not one to
producers or users of cars.1 27 The size of the auto industry, and hence
the allocation of resources, can be expected to be materially different
under the two alternative legal rules.
At this point it would appear that the economist does find the legal
question significant, and that here, unlike the radium watch dial case,
126

Compare, however, the discussion in section 7 supra.

127 A more precise statement of the distinctions that the economist draws among

costs is as follows:
1. Arbitrary costs-those not resulting from the voluntary exchange of resources
and voluntary -use of products. Instances are taxes and subsidies.
2. Non-arbitrary costs-those resulting from the voluntary exchange of resources
and voluntary use of products.
(A) Internal costs-payments required to get the voluntary cooperation of
productive factors and costs imposed on the buyer by the voluntary act
of use. These costs necessarily rest with the user in a voluntary exchange
economy.
(B) Externality costs-costs arising from the interaction of social units with
the production or use process where these social units are not involved
in voluntary cooperation with the producer or user.
The clear distinction in theory between the two kinds of non-arbitrary costs may
sometimes blur in reality. On certain assumptions even the costs in the radium watch
dial instance can be viewed as "externalities." Thus suppose the loss is left on the
consumers rather than the industry, and it is borne at least in part not by them but
by some form of welfare plan to which they do not contribute at all.
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the law can make a mistake in economics. But once again the promise
of a decisive contribution from economics to legal policy slips from our
grasp. In order to know when the law distorts consumer voting in the
allocation of resources, we must first know which group of consumers
should properly confront the cost of auto accidents. If auto accidents are
properly a cost of using autos but the law elects to leave auto accident
losses on the victims, there will be a resulting distortion in the allocation
of resources. If auto accidents are not properly a cost of using autos but
a cost of some other activity-perhaps of living in general-and if the
law elects to shift auto accident losses to the users of autos, there will be
a comparable distortion in the allocation of resources. In this perplexing
situation can the economist advise us where the costs of auto accidents
properly belong? The answer seems to be no. Nothing in his analysis can
inform us whether it is less arbitrary to place the auto accident losses on
the drivers or to leave them with the victims. Economics, in short, cannot
tell us under which legal rule we run the larger risk of distortion.2 8
The root difficulty here is simple and can easily be illustrated by juxtaposing pedestrians and motorists. Whatever can be said about accidents being a consequence of the activity of driving can be said with
equal force about accidents being a consequence of the activity of pedestrianism. 29 It is true that we can make a statistical statement that for
every so many autos on the road there will be so many auto accidents.
But the embarrassment is that one can just as correctly make a statistical
statement that for a certain amount of pedestrian activity there will be
so many auto accidents. Auto accidents appear to be impregnably a cost
of multiple activities.
We seem then, and all too quickly, to have reached an impasse where
we cannot use the economist's criteria to resolve our liability issue. But
again the economist's stance is not quite so negative. He may offer at least
two further observations on which legal rule is preferable.
Recent economic theorizing, associated with the name of Ronald
Coase, might alter the picture1s 0 It had long been assumed that in the
128 It should be noted that we have analyzed the matter thus far only from the
standpoint of the first of the economist's two criteria. We discuss the second at
p. 700 infra.
129 Or of road building, tire manufacturing, shoe repairing, etc. See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961).
But James would dissent; see The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile
Accidents: An Unanswered Challenge, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 408, 415 (1959): "Of course,
automobile owners are not engaged in a joint venture for profit, but they do represent
the class of people who benefit directly from motoring and who-like the ultimate
consumers of the employer's products-may fairly be asked to contribute to the losses
which their common activity of motoring causes."
130 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw &EcoN. 1 (1960).
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situations where the law had a choice of placing a cost on an activity or
of leaving it as an externality to that activity, the decision would inevitably affect the allocation of resources. Coase has argued that if the actors
and victims-that is, the relevant parties-are free to negotiate with each
other and there are no inhibiting costs in bargaining, the result of their
negotiation will be the same allocation of resources regardless of where
the law places the cost. Insofar as this analysis holds, it suggests that once
again, as in the watch dial example, the law cannot make a serious mistake in an economic sense in its choice of liability rule. But unfortunately
this reassurance is not likely to be forthcoming for solution of the auto
accident problem. It is extremely awkward to imagine motorists and potential victims negotiating about their patterns of activity, and it would
seem near fantasy to imagine what the terms of any bargain between
them might be. As to the allocation of resources, in the case of auto accidents the law can still make mistakes in selecting a liability rule.
The second qualification turns on a long established point of economic
analysis which admittedly we have thus far underplayed. We have been
testing alternative legal rules primarily in terms of responsiveness to consumer voting. It is time to deal more directly with the other major goal
of economists which at the outset we accepted-maximizing efficiency in
satisfying wants by reducing unnecessary costs or waste. For this purpose
the important consideration is bringing about the largest net reduction
in costs for the entire economy while it responds to consumer demand.
In the auto accident situation the question becomes whether the choice
of liability rule will make a difference in total costs. This depends not
only on whether, as a result of a given rule, there will be a reduction in
accidents, but also on how expensive the means used to accomplish this
reduction will be. In these terms the argument for putting the loss from
accidents on motorists is that it will hold to a minimum the total net
cost of accidents to society.
This thesis, although stated in economic idiom, reintroduces us to an
old legal friend-deterrence. Generally speaking the law has not taken
very seriously the possibility of deterring with tort sanctions. While imposing liability on drivers might cause some people to decide not to
drive at all, the law has not been sanguine about the impact of liability
on the specific driving behavior of those who do drive.' 3 ' Even apart
from the complications introduced by liability insurance, 32 legal commentary has long emphasized that the driver's own personal safety is
almost certain to be involved in any accident and that financial liability
131 GREGoRY & KALVEN, CASES ON TORTS 690-702 (1959); Netherton, Highway Safety
Under Differing Types of Liability Legislation, 15 OHio ST. L.J. 110 (1954).
132 See infra p. 703.
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on the driver is not likely to add materially to this natural sanction. It
is quite possible that legal commentary has come to this conclusion too
quickly and that there are many situations in the auto world in which
imposition of liability adds a significant stimulus to prudence on the part
of motorists. But there is no need for us to pursue further the troubled
issue of deterrence; it is more profitable to turn to other aspects of the
economist's quest for a liability rule that will hold down waste.
A major difficulty here is that the thesis requires predictions about
behavior of two populations and not just one. It is not enough to predict
that if liability is placed on drivers they will act somewhat differently
and that there will be a net reduction in costs. This prediction must be
weighed against a companion prediction about the reduction in costs if
losses are not shifted to drivers but are left on victims. Conceivably investigation might some day establish that there would be a significant
difference in the cost reducing potential of those two alternatives for handling accident losses. But surely today no one claims to know this much
about the behavior sequences which would be involved. If we are to resort to armchair guessing, the considerations on the one side seem closely
balanced by those on the other.
In seeking to use the waste reducing criterion, we have been posing
the liability issue in the broad terms of whether all auto accident losses
should be placed on drivers or whether all losses should be left on victims. The precise issue is much narrower. Many losses today are shifted
by the common law to drivers; what we are seeking to find in economics
is whether there is justification for shifting the remaining losses onto
drivers. Until now we have considered deterrence without distinguishing
between the possible impact of liability rules on faulty conduct and on
conduct without fault. Whatever little we may know about deterrence, it
seems plausible that liability rules will have a more marked impact on
accidents due to fault than on those not caused by fault. 3 3 If this is accepted, the common law appears to have reached a solution which the
economist might find very bright indeed. Offhand, the common law, with
its negligence and contributory negligence rules, seems to be maximizing
the waste reducing potential of liability rules. It presents inducements to
both drivers and potential victims to be careful.
As a final observation on the quest for a liability rule which will most
economically reduce waste, it may be asked whether this is, in the end,
a prudent way of looking at liability problems. In its efforts to reduce
harmful behavior the law, of course, is not limited to tort sanctions. In
the auto field we can and do use criminal penalties and licensing con133

Compare

R.STArTMENT,

TORTS § 520, comment g (1934).
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trols on drivers. Their availability affects the analysis. If, for example,
the case for strict liability on drivers on waste grounds rests in part on
the prediction that it will tend to keep poor drivers off the roads, the argument becomes much less persuasive when the availability of these other
sanctions is taken into account. Compared with the alternative sanctions,
tort liability conceivably might turn out to be the most expensive, as well
as the least precise, way of holding down waste due to accidents.1 34
This extended excursion into economic analysis has accepted the twin
criteria of having consumers confront proper cost alternatives in casting
their votes, and maximizing output of goods and services in response to
those votes. It is worth emphasizing that the difficulties we have been
experiencing in finding economic clues for legal policy have all arisen
in applying these criteria to the problem of allocating liability for harms.
We now turn to ask whether these two economic criteria standing alone
can ever provide a sufficient definition of public policy for the law.
The economist would be the first to warn us that his criteria may not
be sufficient for the law. In addition to the goals he has considered, there
is a basic question of equity that the law cannot escape the obligation to
answer. In simplest form it is, who should be made poorer as a result of
134 The tort sanction coupled with compulsory insurance tends to price driving out
of the market for some. This total cessation of driving can be regarded as a cost or
expense of this route to accident prevention when compared to methods which would
simply reduce careless driving or reduce driving without eliminating it.
After our text was in final form, we received a copy of an unpublished paper by
Simon Rottenburg entitled Liability in Law and Economics, dealing with the question
"What is the optimal rule for the compensation of persons damaged by accident?" His
statement of the economist's goal in accident prevention is illuminating: "Putting to
one side ethical questions implicit in the compensation principle, the primary economic
object of a liability rule applied to activities causing personal injuries or death is the
prevention of accidents, and this because either of these occurrences deprives society
of the output the injured or dead person may have produced had the accident not
occurred.
"The social purpose is served by the contrivance of incentives for the prevention of
accidents or for the prevention of injuries when accidents do occur. The incidence of
accidents is a partial negative function of the quantity of resources devoted to accidentprevention. The larger the incentive, the larger will be the quantity of resources put to
this use and the smaller will be the number of accidents. The incentive may take the
form of costs imposed upon those whose behavior causes accidents. But it is unlikely
that the social welfare is maximized by the prevention of all accidents because the
cost of achieving a zero incidence would undoubtedly be too great. What is wanted is
the use, in preventing accidents, of that quantity of resources such that the value of
the extra resources used to save the marginal life is equal to the value of that life and
the equi-marginal condition is satisfied. Then a unit of resources put to this use will
have the same yield as in any other. Yield is measured, in this case, by the expected
output of the marginal life saved, net of the expected lifetime consumption of the
relevant person, discounted at an appropriate time rate. If either less or more resources
are put to this use than is implied by this principle, there is social waste. Either too
few or too many accidents occur, too few or too many injuries or deaths ensue, and,
given the cost, too much or too little of otherwise lost output is retained."
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an accident loss? On this issue the economist once again will find helpful
the distinction between inescapable user costs involved in the radium
watch dial situation and auto accident injuries which can be externalities
to purchasing or using a car. In the former case the economist can reassure us that, as between consumers of watches as a class and the watch
industry, the choice of legal rules as to liability does not pose an equity
problem since the cost cannot be taken off the users. In the latter case
the economist will confirm what the law has long recognized-that its
choice of liability rule will make either victims as a class or motorists as
a class poorer. This issue of justice is one on which our hypothetical
economic adviser takes no position. Yet there might well be a conflict
between pursuing the economist's two goals and satisfying a sense of justice in distributing economic goods. Even if it could be shown that putting the cost of all accidents on drivers would minimize the net cost of
accidents, the justice of making motorists as a class poorer would still be
open to serious challenge.
In retrospect, the harvest from being patient with economic analysis
proves to be somewhat ironic. In the situation in which his analysis is
most refreshing, the economist tells us that the liability issue is not worth
arguing about except possibly as a strategy for compulsory accident insurance; and in the other situation, where he stresses that the legal rule
does affect the allocation of resources, his analysis at best yields indecisive
clues as to the proper answer. To exaggerate only a little, when the economist is helpful he says that the legal problem is not worth arguing about;
when he finds the legal problem consequential, he cannot be helpful in
fashioning a solution. And in any event, the two criteria borrowed from
him do not profess to touch issues of equity that are the ultimate concern
of the law.
10
We have argued that there is no basis in common sense, economic
analysis or in justice for placing the cost of all accidents on motorists. In
working through this argument we have not devoted much attention to
the actual mechanics of liability insurance in our society. The fact, of
course, is that most motorists carry liability insurance; and for convenience in further analysis we will assume that all motorists insure under
a compulsory liability scheme.' 35 The proponent of a compensation plan
may now claim that there has been a hiatus in our analysis as it bears on
putting costs on motorists. With compulsory insurance assumed, costs,
whatever the legal principle on which they are allocated, will be expe135 And further that there is no problem of "under insurance"; see notes 51 and 55
supra.
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rienced by motorists only through charges for insurance premiums. Liability insurance necessarily ties the fate of any one motorist to the conduct of a mass of other motorists. It is this pooling of risks which it might
be argued impeaches some aspects of our former analysis.
A few salient features about auto liability insurance now become relevant. Perhaps the most significant for our purposes is that insurance
rates by and large do not discriminate among motorists. It is only a moderate exaggeration to say that liability risks are so homogenized that, with
some important exceptions, all motorists are charged as though they represented the same risk. 36 To the extent that the rates do discriminate,
the most widely used criteria are impersonal actuarial categories, such as
extremes of age, family composition, geographical location and type of
vehicle. In the limited instances in which the discrimination is based on
the safety history of the particular motorist, the relevant criterion is simply accident involvement. 137 Neither in recording the accident involvement of the individual motorist nor in making the comparisons between
various classes of motorists is attention paid to the incidence of fault. The
insurance industry could scarcely do otherwise, given the need for a
sound statistical base in establishing differential premium rates. In short,
liability insurers in allocating costs among the insured appear to think
in strict liability terms.
Undoubtedly the current formulas for allocating costs among insureds
present some substantial issues of policy. 138 At the moment, however, the
question is simply whether such considerations add any force to the case
for burdening motorists with the cost of compensating victims who are
ineligible for recovery at common law. Several aspects of our earlier
analysis need to be re-examined in this connection. But first we must look
at a new argument in support of strict liability which emerges in the insurance context.
When we turn to the setting of insurance rates, does not our whole
quest for a proper basis for handling accident costs become absurd? If we
are willing to tolerate gross arbitrariness in allocating cost among insureds, so the new argument runs, are we not being ultra-fastidious in
worrying so much about who should bear the cost of accident losses not
shifted off victims today? What is involved here are two wholly distinct
variables which affect the premium charged the individual motorist. One
136 Morris, supra note 129; Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability
Insurance, 58 MICH. L. REv. 689 (1960).
137 Under the omnibus clause, an accident involving the omnibus insured is charged
under the usual practice against the record of the principal insured.
138 How many refinements to introduce in classifying insureds is a general problem
for all types of insurance. See JOsEPH soN, DISCIMINATION, A STUDY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE (1960).
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is the total cost to be borne by the insurance pool; the other is the formula for sharing this total cost among the individual motorists who contribute to the pool. In effect the critic urges that although both variables
significantly affect the premium level, in our analysis we have been obsessed with policy concerning the first and have been indifferent to the
second. A simple illustration may sharpen the issue. Let us assume that
a given motorist now pays a premium of $100. A shift to a compensation
plan would increase his premium to $150. Absent a plan, if more sensitive discriminations were made in setting rates, his premium would be
$25. The critic asserts that we are more concerned about the 50% increase
called for by a plan than by the 150% overpayment which typifies the
existing system. Since we are willing to tolerate the larger inequity, how
can we rationally insist upon being so pure about the other?
We readily grant that there may be serious injustices in setting insurance rates, and that for all we know they may bulk larger from the point
of view of an individual insured than the consequences of moving to a
compensation plan. But despite the elaborateness of the critic's argument,
it is still true that two wrongs do not make a right. All that the argument
amounts to is a call for doing something to improve the standard for
setting of rates among the insureds. We would agree.
There is an interesting variant of this argument. The crux is that as
long as liability is keyed to fault, our insurance system is tied to an insurable event which is unmanageable. It is impossible to set rates among
insureds fairly since it is impractical to take fault into account in establishing subcategories of risks. In its most general form the argument
is that the insurable event provides a new criterion for the selection of
a liability rule. Since, as we have said, the auto insurance industry seems
to think in strict liability terms in setting rates, the law should adopt a
liability system which is as congenial as possible to the insurance mechanism. Presumably strict liability alone would fit the prescription.
The underlying assumption here is not tenable. No one has the information which is needed to make the judgment that the combination
of compulsory liability insurance with liability keyed to fault necessarily
will have the consequence of producing an improper allocation of insurance costs among insureds. In order to make that judgment it would be
necessary to know in advance the distribution of fault among drivers in
causing accidents. Such information seems to be inaccessible, at least at
present. If the distribution were known, there is nothing about the insurance system which in theory would prevent that data from being used in
discriminating among insureds. In the present state of ignorance, the
system at least randomizes the chances of error involved in not having
categories based on fault. Further, auto insurance today so little exploits
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the possibility of using differential premiums based on already accessible
factors that it is extravagantly premature to urge a shift to strict liability in order to allow for an improvement in the justice of allocating
premiums among the insureds. Finally, it is not true that any one liability principle provides an insurable event that is more congenial to
the art of insurance than does any other liability principle. "Sound"
pricing of insurance only requires being able to measure and project the
incidence of the insurable event in a given population. One insurable
event is as manageable as another.
So much for using insurance mechanics to argue for strict liability.
We move now to a re-examination of our earlier analysis in the light of
insurance considerations.
It will be recalled that one economic goal we accepted was having
139
consumers face up to proper full costs in choosing among alternatives.
The argument has been advanced that insurance succeeds not only in
spreading costs but perhaps even more significantly it also succeeds in
educating users about costs. On this educational feature it might be
possible to suggest another rationale for placing the cost of the additional
coverage under a plan on motorists. In discussing the goal of realistic
consumer choice, we pointed out that regrettably it was impossible to
tell whether the cost of an accident not due to the fault of the driver
was a cost of using autos, or of being a pedestrian, or of just living in
society. Assuming a wide use of liability insurance, the new proposal
would be to place some fraction, say one-half, of such cost on motorists
in order to confront them with it as a cost of operating a car. The
assumption is that it is plausible that some part of the cost of all auto
accidents belongs to motoring as an activity, and that we cannot be far
wrong if we settle for one-half. 140 It is then argued that consumers are
presented with more realistic cost alternatives where half of these losses
is made a cost of motoring than where none is, especially since a car is
involved in all auto accidents while pedestrians or other factors need not
be present in every instance.
Such arguments are ingenious but not persuasive. The whole point
to this aspect of economic analysis is that resources should be allocated
in response to consumer voting and that the allocation should not be
distorted by confronting consumers with improper cost alternatives.
Assigning some arbitrary fraction of accident losses to motoring does not
necessarily reduce such distortion. It might sound prudent to split the
139 See section 9 supra.
140 We borrow here from an argument made to us by Guido Calabresi of the Yale
Law School. We understand that he will soon be publishing his own analysis of many
of the issues we have covered.
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loss in two, but there is no way of knowing whether charging motorists
50% of the loss brings about more or less of a distortion than would
charging them nothing for losses-or charging them everything.
It will also be recalled that a second economic goal which we accepted
in our prior analysis was that of maximizing output through minimizing
waste. 141 In the matter of auto accidents, pursuit of this objective would
dictate placing the cost of accident losses on that class of persons who
would take steps to reduce accidents by the least costly means. We
recognized that this was simply a different way of approaching the not
unfamiliar problem of deterrence. We concluded that tort sanctions
probably had little impact on the quality of driving conduct; but we
observed that if deterrence of accidents were taken as a serious goal for
liability policy it appeared that the common law combination of negligence and contributory negligence was most likely to maximize whatever deterrent potential there might be. We have now reached a convenient place to consider what bearing use of liability insurance has on
these possibilities for reducing waste.
The obvious point is that insurance may dampen whatever stimulus
to deterrence there may be in liability rules. To the extent that the
pooling of risks for insurance purposes homogenizes insureds, as it does
by and large under current practices, it can only blunt the impact of
liability on driving conduct. But, at most, all that such considerations
do is to weaken a very faint argument on behalf of the fault liability
principle. They in no way strengthen the affirmative case for a compensation plan.
Such discussion serves to remind us once more that there is much room
for experimentation and greater daring in setting insurance rates for the
sake of creating more deterrent impact. From time to time insurance
companies have experimented with classifications based on safe driving
histories so as to give rate discounts to drivers who have good records
from an insurance point of view. A well established English practice has
been to offer a discount to a motorist where there has been no claim
against his liability policy over stated periods, with the discount increasing for each successive claim-free period. 142 Certain companies in the
United States have experimented with a demerit point system based on
the presence or absence of moving traffic violations. 43 Recently there
141

See section 9 supra.

Netherton, Highway Safety Under Differing Types of Liability Legislation, 15
ST. L.J. 110, 123-24 (1954).
For example, the "Safe Driver Insurance Plan" initiated a few years ago in
California. Under it each moving violation and each involvement in an auto accident,
regardless of fault, is scored as a point against the insured. Motorists with one point
142
OHIO
143
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have been suggestions that deterrence might be increased by use of a
mandatory deductible provision which would take loss off the victim
but leave part of it on the negligent driver. 44 In general, however, the
whole experience in the United States with such rating devices has not
been very encouraging. Premium differences have, for the most part, been
relatively small and unglamorous, and further elaboration along these
lines, it is feared, may tend to complicate or embarrass the insurers in
the ready marketing of their product. The rate differences, moreover,
have usually been in the form of reductions in premiums for safe driving
and have been advertised and understood as rewards and not as penalties.
We suspect that these differentials serve not so much to affect driving
conduct as to establish fairer rates for those who are the careful drivers
anyway. But whether or not more effective arrangements can be devised,
the topic has little bearing on the main theme of our analysis. The
potentiality for differentiating premiums in terms of safe driving in no
respect depends on changing from the common law system to a compensation plan.
Two final details. There may be some additional economies in shifting
from insurance under a fault system to insurance under a compensation
plan. Some of the diseconomies which exist today in the processing of
claims because of the duplication of insurance coverage could be eliminated. 145 These savings, however, are not likely to be large enough to
affect significantly our previous analysis of the possibility of financing a
compensation plan through internal economies.' 4 6
It is appropriate to take another glance at the social security approach
to a plan in this insurance context. The fact that now becomes visible is
that the tax to finance social security coverage of accidents could be either
flat or progessive, but it could not exploit differentials of the kind we have
just discussed in connection with liability insurance carried by motorists.
In utilizing a social security approach there would be no way of tying
costs imposed on individuals to their safety records or their accident
exposure. To the extent that otherwise obtainable deterrence is sacrificed,
the social security model loses in attractiveness.
This digression on liability insurance has, we think, shown that nothing
is changed significantly when we explicitly take account of how insurance
costs are shared among the insureds. Neither the risk pooling aspects of
pay the regular rate. Those with no points pay 20% less, and those with more than
one point pay progressively more up to a maximum of 100% for five or more points.
144 Oppenheimer, Insured to Kill, 1953 INS. L.J. 14.
145 Compare EHRENZWEIG, "FULL Am" INSURANCE (1954).

146 See section 8 supra.
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insurance nor its other characteristics alter the balance of the argument
for a compensation plan.
11

We have noted that, generally speaking, compensation plans have two
major targets: elimination of some or all the gaps in coverage and improvement in the timing of payment to victims. 1 47 The main policy im-

plications raised by extension of coverage have called for a detailed
analysis of four possible ways for financing the cost of the additional
coverage. We have now finished that, the major, segment of our discussion. We are ready to turn to the policy implications of the second
target of compensation plans-expediting payment of compensation to
victims.
If the timing of payments to victims is a criterion, the common law
system of compensation comes out badly. Recent studies of auto accident
law in action have vividly documented how clumsily the common law
often times its payments. 148 But the common law was not set up as a
system to finance payment of the urgent and immediate needs of victims.
From the beginning it has been regarded as a system for ultimately
allocating the cost of accidents. It is true that its shortcomings in paying
compensation promptly are aggravated by court congestion and the
dilatory tactics of those participating in the process. The deficiency of
the common law as a first aid mechanism, however, goes far beyond such
considerations; it is intrinsic to its liability for fault rationale. That
principle necessarily clouds the handling of a great number of claims
by putting liability in doubt. The sad consequence from the point of
view of the welfare of the victim is that current payments, to cover
emergency needs, might well not be forthcoming until the ultimate
149
liability issue has been resolved.
The experience with workmen's compensation is instructive. Although
there is still ample controversy over claims, almost all of it concerns the
final amount of disability awards and not interim payments for medical
and emergency expenses. No conceivable improvement in the common
law could speed up its payments enough to meet this challenge from a
compensation plan.
Prompt payment, all other things being equal, is an indisputable
advantage. Does recognition of this advantage change the balance of
policy arguments on auto compensation plans? Or is the advantage of
147

See section 5 supra.

148 Especially the Conard study. See note 12 supra.
149 A familiar strain on the personal injury bar in congested court areas is financing
badly injured claimants while the litigation is pending. ZEIsFL, KALVEN & BUCHHOLZ,
DE,LAY IN THE COURT xxiii (1959).
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promptness, like the advantage of additional coverage, one which can
be had only at a price?
On reflection it will be seen that there necessarily, is a price, but that
it is curiously complicated to trace. The key fact is that prompt payment of accident claims can be had only by increasing coverage of victims.
Promptness depends on making payment of claims, or some component
of them, virtually automatic, and this in turn depends on simplifying
the liability profile by eliminating distinctions, and in particular that
between fault and no fault. The additional coverage of course involves
an additional cost. To complete the circle, the price for enabling prompt
payment is the cost of financing the additional coverage. The issue can
now be more fully stated: Does the advantage of prompt payment alter
in any way the assessment we already have made of the cost question?
We shall explore the question by revisiting briefly each of the four
alternatives for financing additional coverage.
All along we have agreed that wider coverage of accident victims is an
attractive idea, but we have insisted that the question of who properly
and justly should pay the cost must be confronted. A compensation plan
becomes even more attractive when we consider its feature of prompt
payment of medical and emergency expenses to all victims. However,
there is nothing about the desirability of having claims paid promptly
that increases the persuasiveness of the case for placing new costs on
motorists. Our earlier analysis of putting added costs on motorists is
unaffected.
Similarly, there is no need to modify our analysis of financing additional costs through effectuating economies in handling claims by switching from the common law to a compensation plan. Nothing about
promptness in payment increases the likelihood that the cost problem
can be solved merely by such economies. 150
In considering the possibility of financing the added cost by reallocating damages among victims, we do find a new stimulus to analysis.
When we examined the case for financing coverage of new victims in
this manner, we encountered, it may be recalled, two major difficulties:
It was hard to see why more deserving victims should be asked to surrender part of their awards to less deserving victims, without getting
any benefit in return; and it was hard to explain why, if damage awards
are to be lowered, the insured motorists are not entitled to a rebate. 151
Both of these difficulties are lessened in the new context. The decisive
150 There may be some economies. Delay in making payments is itself likely to
entail costs. Further, if payments are prompt, it may be easier to integrate a program
of accident insurance and a program of liability insurance.
151 See section 6 supra.
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point is that, unlike expanded coverage which would benefit only new
victims, prompt payment would benefit all victims. Thus, old victims
-those compensable at common law-might be seen as getting a quid
pro quo by accepting reduced awards in return for greatly increased
promptness in payment. Moreover, the insured motorists would have no
claim to a rebate in this context. Awards, it is assumed, are to be reduced not because damages are too high but because payment is too
slow. If the image is that the previously eligible victims are willing to
negotiate with the newly covered victims-and to take less in order to
take sooner-their bargain is no concern of the motorists.
We cannot resist underscoring how striking this argument for a plan
is. Motorists cannot complain because they are not called on to pay
more and they have no claim to a rebate. Old victims as a class apparently have no cause to complain since they gain the advantage of prompt
payment. New victims, of course, end up being covered. We seem to have
only winners and no losers.
But of course the matter is somewhat more complicated. On further
analysis there are at least three reasons for thinking that not all of the
old victims would be delighted with the bargain made on their behalf.
People do react differently if confronted with the choice of taking a
small but certain amount now or gambling on a larger but less certain
payment in the future. 15 2 Further, all victims are offered the same bargain, regardless of how good a common law claim they are forced to
give up. And it is obvious that inasmuch as the economic circumstances
of victims vary, so will their need for prompt payment of medical and
emergency expenses. In short, there is still some force in the argument
that in making a reallocation of damages to finance a plan, we would be
transferring money from more deserving to less deserving victims.
This vision of a bargain also has some embarrassments which we have
met before. 153 Any bargain which assumes that no new costs will be put
on motorists is treacherous because, as noted earlier, once a plan is
adopted it will be difficult to determine whether the burden on motorists
is being increased. It is only too likely that the burden on motorists will
be increased gradually so that the principle involved in rescinding the
bargain can never be debated.
These last considerations lead easily to the final point to be reexamined-financing the additional costs along social security lines. On
152 The experience under the Family Plan insurance scheme, discussed in section 4

supra, is instructive here; except for very small claims, few victims were attracted by
the opportunity to trade their contingent claim to payment in the future for a certain,
albeit smaller, payment now.
153 See section 6 supra.
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our view the case for handling compensation payments through a social
security system is strengthened when prompt payment of medical and
emergency expenses is taken as a major objective. Welfare then becomes
a dominant theme. It would seem more congenial to switch the discourse
into a welfare framework and to recognize that the common law categories of thought are wholly out of place in such a context. The ease of
accommodating a rationale for prompt payment to victims under a social
security approach underscores how artificial and unduly ingenious is the
case for bribing old victims with prompt payment in order to cover new
victims. If one is serious about the overriding importance of speedy payment to victims, the most appropriate approach would seem to be extension of social security measures.
At this point we repeat the observation we already have made about
the provinciality of auto compensation plans as welfare measures. If it is
important to provide speedy medical and emergency payments to those
who suffer the misfortune of auto accidents, it must be equally important
to provide equally prompt payments to those who suffer comparable
misfortunes from other causes.
12
We have now completed an examination of what we would regard as
the main issues of policy concerning auto compensation plans. We are
aware that we have not discussed many points that are salient in the
literature. To anyone acquainted with the literature on plans, it will
be apparent that we have insisted on imposing our own analytic structure on the topic. Thus we have said hardly anything about court congestion, the maintenance of the jury system, the status of the trial bar,
154
and the prospect of further state intervention in the insurance industry.
It is to such points as these that we now turn as a kind of extended
postscript.
On our view these points concern by-products and side effects of
adopting a compensation plan. In judging the merits of any large scale
reform, it is of course relevant to weigh in the balance the various
collateral effects which can be anticipated. Much of the discussion of
compensation plans, however, seems concerned not with the attractiveness or unattractiveness of these effects, but rather with a type of realpolitic speculation on how they affect the likelihood that the reform
will, as a political matter, be acceptable. It may well be that, because
of the probable effects of a plan on the trial bar and the private insurance industry, no plan will -in the foreseeable future muster enough
political support to gain adoption. The experience of the past thirty
154 Or, to add still another, the problem of the out-of-state motorist.
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years following the first announcement of the Columbia plan suggests
that resistance to this sort of a plan is strong indeed; and no study is
needed to demonstrate that there is a remarkably great gap between the
enthusiasm of the majority of the academic specialists for a plan and the
negative reaction of state legislatures and public officials. The most telling evidence of the political power of the insurance industry is found in
the history of even so modest a reform as compulsory liability insurance
for all motorists. It has been adopted only in a handful of states and
this after a gap of twenty-five years before another state followed the
lead of Massachusetts. 155 If the problem is one of prediction, an always
risky venture, the outlook for compensation plans impresses us as being
not bright.
We mention prospects for the future because, as is so often the case in
discussion of policy, there is a tendency to elide prediction into treatment of the merits. In the federal tax field, we have long been familiar
with the phenomenon that certain major reforms are almost never discussed seriously since it is believed that they have no reasonable prospect
of being adopted; active discussion tends to be limited to minor changes
at the edges of the rules. 156 It is a prerogative of academic analysis to
define the realm of the possible more generously than need the man of
affairs. Under this license we turn to consider possible side effects of
compensation plans, advisedly ignoring how these affect the likelihood
of a plan being adopted.
One feature of a plan often urged as a positive advantage is that it
would provide a remedy for court congestion. 157 Personal injury litigation constitutes the overwhelming fraction of all cases in large urban
court systems, and since the auto accident looms large among the sources
of personal injury, there is no doubt that taking auto cases out of the
court system pursuant to a plan would dramatically reduce the congestion problem in urban courts. It would be difficult to imagine any
single step likely to have more decisive impact on court delay. Nonetheless, we would reject this as an independent argument on behalf of a
plan. Court congestion, although a stubborn and serious matter today,
is surely not an intrinsic characteristic of the common law system, and
155 GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES ON TORTS

733-42 (1959).

156 The lack of practical discussion or action engendered by the radical and critical
analysis of the federal income tax law in SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938)
and FED AL TAX REFORM (1950) furnishes perhaps a classic instance. See also Blum,
Federal Income Tax Reform-Twenty Questions, 41 TAxEs 672 (1963).
157 ZEISEL, KALVEN & BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959). Compare Hofstadter,
Alternative Proposal to the Compensation Plan, 1956 INS. L.J. 331; Hofstadter, A
Proposed Automobile Accident Compensation Plan, 328 ANNALS 53 (March 1960).
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many areas of the United States do not today experience it.15s The court
congestion problem should be dealt with directly and on its own terms;
it should not be permitted to serve as a justification for radical changes
in the substantive law. Unless persuaded of the merits of a plan, court
congestion apart, one cannot endorse a plan simply because it will help
with court delay. 59
A plan can also be expected to have important consequences for the
contemporary trial scene and especially for the trial judge, the personal
injury bar and the civil jury. Under a plan, a major group of cases
would be withdrawn from the trial process and turned over to an administrative process. It is widely feared that the result would be a kind
of technological unemployment for the trial judge and the trial lawyer.
It is becoming familiar at bar association gatherings to hear some leader
of the bar sound Jeremiah-like warnings about the dark future of the
bench and bar under plans. But it is easy to overstate the drama of these
changes. Probably few trial judges in urban courts would be literally
unemployed after the switch to a plan; and, as we saw earlier, the
negotiating and settlement functions of lawyers, which are today the
lion's share of the bar's personal injury activities, would still be in
demand. 160 The adoption of a plan, however, would mark a long step
away from the centrality of litigation as the traditional method of resolving stubborn controversies.
The impact of a plan on the jury system presents for us a more interesting issue. Under a plan a major part of the contemporary function of the
civil jury would disappear.' 61 Despite the fact that one could have a
plan which retained the jury trial for controversies not disposed of by
negotiation, all plans appear to transfer such residual controversy into
administrative channels. This readiness to eliminate the jury probably
has several sources: the convenience of borrowing from the existing
workmen's compensation format, the hope of speeding up the process of
158 See the annual calendar studies of the Institute of Judicial Administration,
which cover approximately 100 courts throughout the United States.
159 Compare Zeisel, .The Jury and Court Delay, 328 ANNALS 46 (March 1960).
160 See section 7 supra.
161 Under most proposed plans the jury would disappear altogether. Under the
Saskatchewan plan, it is retained in the common law action over for damages in excess
of the schedule. Under the special English combination of social insurance and tort
remedy, it is available in theory. However, by an independent reform, England has
since World War II greatly reduced the jurisdiction of the civil jury. See DEVLiN, TRiA.
By JuRY (1956); Friedman, Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63
HAv. L. Rv. 241 (1949); Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident
Compensation, 50 CoLuM. L. Rav. 300, 329 (1950); cf. James, The Columbia Study of
Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An Unanswered Challenge, 59 COLUM. L.
R v. 408, 420 (1959).
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adjudication, and the respect for administrative expertise. It is worth
observing that in some ways the case for establishing an administrative
agency seems upside down here. Today the standard argument for having
an administrative agency, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Federal Communications Commission, is that the regulation of
a complex technical field is involved, requiring special experience and skill
and the need to develop a set of structured rules. The role of a commission under an auto compensation plan would be startlingly different.
It would face questions of historical fact as to whether the event giving
rise to the claim actually happened, and questions of medical fact as to
the nature and extent of injury and disability. The liability issue, and to
some degree the damage issue, would be considerably simpler than the
ones we have traditionally left to the jury at common law. 162 We thus
would appear to be following the curious sequence of first simplifying
the issues and then shifting them from a layman to an expert tribunal.
The basis for dropping the jury may come from a different corner.
Under common law the jury is entrusted with two great issues: to draw
the negligence line and to put an individual dollar price on damages in
a particular case. These both pre-eminently require the common sense
and feel of the community, which it has been the special genius of the
jury to supply. By its strict liability rule a plan would make unnecessary
the negligence discrimination, and by its damages schedule a plan would
make unnecessary the individualized pricing of damages. The reason
then why a plan can do without a jury is that it does not require these
distinctive strengths of the jury.
Whatever the reasons for dropping the jury, retaining it under a plan
never seems to get explicit consideration. There perhaps is a lesson here
in the process by which major social changes are brought to pass in our
society. For two hundred years the merits of the jury system in civil
cases have been strongly attacked and strongly defended; for almost the
whole time it has remained peculiarly immune to change in the United
States. Yet, as in the case of the workmen's compensation acts, auto
compensation plans would result in sweeping away the jury in an important area of civil controversy. It may be that radical alteration in the
use of juries in our society can come about only when the change is
regarded as a minor facet of a program of substantive reform.
Indeed, if elimination of the jury were not taken for granted under
auto compensation plans, the experience with workmen's compensation
in some localities might well supply a lively defense for retaining the
institution. The argument would be that the jury is protection against
162 The liability issue will always be simpler. However, the damage issue may
have its complexities; see section 6 supra.
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corruption. An old point is involved. Conventionally the case for the
jury has been thought strongest where there is reason to doubt the
neutrality and integrity of the judge. It seems to us that the case loses
none of its force where there is reason to doubt the neutrality and integrity of administrators who transfer large sums of money through adjudication. The protective role of the jury very likely is even more
needed vis-A-vis administrators than vis-4-vis judges. 63
We consider next the impact of auto plans on the insurance industry.
Its spokesmen have been untiring in' alerting society to the dangers they
perceive. In assessing the industry's brief, it is difficult to separate out the
objections which go to compensation plans from those which go to compulsory liability insurance. The industry's position on compulsory insurance is an oft told story and need not be repeated in detail. 164 We would
note only that there appears to be a slight suggestion of perversity in
the industry's resistance to a governmental move designed to make
everyone buy its product. 165 What interests us now is to see whether there
are any objections to compensation plans from the insurance industry's
point of view that are distinctive to plans and not simply repetitive of
its objections to compulsory insurance.
The arguments offered publicly to date have been unfocused and not
in response to any particular auto plan. They have left the general
impression that the case largely reduces to cliches about moving further
163 This conclusion is based on conversations with experienced
lawyers in large metropolitan areas.

compensation

164 See HENSLEY, COMPETITION, REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NON-LIFE

INSURANCE 116-33 (1962); Knepper, Law, Insurance and the Automobile Accident
Victim: A Defense of the Present Legal System, 29 J. INS. 159. (1962); Kramer, Fallacies
of a Compensation Plan for Automobile Accident Litigation, 26 INs. COUNSEL J. 420
(1959); Lilly in Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUM.
L. REv. 785, 803-12 (1932); Sherman, Grounds for Opposing the Automobile Accident
Compensation Plan, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 598 (1936).
165 A special commission reporting in 1929 on the Massachusetts experience with
compulsory liability insurance, observed: "The state requires its citizens to wear
clothes on the street, and to a certain limited extent even on the stage, or at least
the state would lock them up if they did not, but it does not follow that the state may
'properly' establish a state clothing monopoly to 'supply its citizens' with the clothing
which 'it requires' them to wear and force them to buy their clothes of the state.
Yet the requirements that clothes be worn in public applies to all citizens except
babies, while the requirement of motor vehicle insurance applies only to a part of
the citizens. We see no more justification for requiring a man or woman to buy
state insurance, when he or she prefers t9 buy private insurance in a responsible company, than there is for requiring a man or woman to buy all his or her clothes from
the state. If there is legislative power to make such a requirement, we believe it is one
of those powers, like the power to move the State House dome into the Frog Pond,
which should not be exercised." REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION TO STUDY COMPULSORY MOTbR VEHICLE LIABILITY INSURANCE AND RELATED MATTERS, 15 MASS. L.Q. No. 3
p. 175 (1930).
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down the road to serfdom. To go deeper we need to speculate about
what particular threats distress the industry.
Two prophecies of doom for the private liability insurance industry
are to be distinguished. One is that adoption of a plan will slowly but
inevitably lead to ever broader regulation of the industry until it becomes simply a private arm of government in collecting and distributing
funds. There is little new or helpful that can be said about how well
grounded is the fear of gradual encroachment. The evidence under
workmen's compensation leans the other way; after half a century of
experience in the majority of states there exists a lively private industry
of insurance carriers. 166 The other prediction is that from the outset the
very design of certain compensation plans will preclude any significant
role for private industry. This dearly would be so if the plan took the
form of a welfare scheme for potential victims, financed through taxation,
and administered along the lines of our social security system. Those
who on other grounds would rate the social security model as best must
confront the question whether its advantages are sufficient to offset the
disadvantages of curtailing the private insurance industry and increasing
the role of government.
Short of a plan which eliminated the need for private insurance altogether, the industry concern may be that a plan would call for use of
state funds to supplement the compensation pool raised through private
insurance premiums. Such a subsidy would place the industry in the
position of being a partner with the state, causing it to be regarded as
a trustee administering state funds in handling claims. From the industry's point of view, the prospect is a stifling degree of supervision
over the administrative and selling costs which the industry could charge
against premiums collected.
Even absent a contribution of state funds, the type of insurance required for a compensation plan is likely to lead to a higher degree of
standardization for the industry. Public autho'rities presumably would
prescribe the coverage, policy limits, payment conditions, and settlement
terms and procedures. As a consequence, there would be far less room
for competition between companies on the basis of premiums, service or
policy terms. And most dramatically, there would be economic and
political pressures to redesign the marketing practices of the industry to
accommodate this increased standardization and to avoid the diseconomies associated with the present methods of merchandising liability
insurance.
To overgeneralize, the possible threats of plans range from eliminating
166 See DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1936).
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at the outset the entire role of the industry down to rendering obsolete
the practices that have most markedly characterized it in the past as a
private industry. The perceptions of any of these changes can account
for the opposition of the industry to plans. Among these degrees of
state intervention we see an important difference. The strength of the
industry might be curtailed through regulation, but so long as it remains outside the government the industry could continue to be an important island of private power. It is a characteristic of insurance company arguments against plans to elide this distinction and, as a result,
to move too rapidly from the danger of increased regulation to the
danger of "nationalization."
We should again stress that for us the relevant question as to side
effects is not whether they will irritate certain groups in the society and
cause the mounting of political opposition to a plan; the question rather
is whether they constitute changes which must be weighed impartially
in deciding upon over-all policy. But we should caution that in the case
of effects on the insurance industry, it is especially difficult to separate
out the irritants-such as loss of profits or prestige-from the genuine
costs to society.
13
It is obvious that we have been able to talk about auto compensation
plans at considerable length without directly discussing any plan in
particular-the Saskatchewan Plan, 167 the Columbia Plan, 16s the Green
Plan, 69 the Keeton Plan, 170 or the Ehrenzweig Plan. 71' We are not
guilty, however, of playing Hamlet without Hamlet. All of the particular
plans are hybrids as to financing the coverage for additional victims.17 2
Some of these plans may well be defensible, if not admirable, as political
compromises. But we would insist that one should not confuse universes.
Our commitment has been to mapping and exploring the basic policy
issues that any plan must entail.' 73
167 See note 157 supra; GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES ON TORTS 757.60 (1959); Rokes,
The Saskatchewan Plan, 29 J. INS. 373 (1962).
168 See note 6 supra.
169 See note 13 supra.
170 See note 2 supra.
171 See note 9 supra.
172 Thus, the Columbia Plan both reduces common law damages and places the
additional costs of coverage on drivers, combining the routes we discuss in sections 6
and 9 respectively. The most complex financing scheme is found in EHRENzWEyG,
"FULL Am" INSURANCE (1954); see Kalven, Book Review, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 778 (1955).
173 We suspect that whatever consensus there may be for preferring a plan over
the common law depends in considerable part upon the circumstance that the ad-

1964]

AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS

We come at last to the end of that long and winding road of analysis.
From this vantage point it may be appropriate to try a brief summary
statement of how the case for an auto compensation plan looks to us
now.
We of course find attractive the two main objectives of plans: to
compensate all victims and to provide medical and emergency expense
payments promptly. Nor can there be any argument but that the common law fails to achieve either of these. It does not achieve the first
because it intends as a matter of policy to leave some victims uncompensated; and it cannot as a matter of practice achieve the second
inasmuch as it limits liability to fault and hence subjects that issue to
controversy.
In analyzing plans it quickly becomes apparent that the old common
law issue of liability translates into a question of costs. Changing the
form of the question does not cause the underlying issue to evaporate.
Any plan requires coverage of additional victims in order to achieve
its twin objectives. Additional coverage of victims means additional
cost. The central policy problem, in weighing the merits of plans, is:
How is this additional cost to be defrayed?
The solution most frequently suggested is to put the cost on motorists,
and thus to pose the issue of strict liability versus negligence. We have
been unable to find a satisfactory justification for imposing the additional
cost on motorists. Once the fault criterion has been laid aside, we see
no basis in common sense for charging them. We are unimpressed with
arguments based on the perception of an irreversible historical trend.
And we derive no support for charging motorists from economic analysis
of the superior risk bearer formula.
But this is by no means the end of the argument. There are three other
ways of financing the cost of additional coverage. At least in theory this
means that there are alternative methods of moving to an auto compensation plan without obligating motorists as a class to pay more than
they now pay under common law. It is therefore not necessary or helpful
to tie analysis of compensation plans to the debate over strict liability
versus negligence.
The first alternative is to seek financing through economies in handling
claims expected to follow from simplifying the criteria for making payments to victims. As a solution this has the great appeal of appearing to
be painless to all concerned, except possibly to the lawyers whose fees
would be substantially reduced. This approach, however, is not apt to
vocates have not been required to agree on which of the four routes to a plan is
proper or best.
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take us as far as is hoped. At best the magnitude of the savings from
internal economies alone is likely to fall far short of requirements, and
at worst it is likely to be offset by an increase in claims consciousness.
The second alternative is to generate the financing by reallocating
awards among victims. The arresting aspect of this approach is that while
motorists remain unaffected by the switch to a plan, the victims who
would be eligible for recovery at common law are materially affected.
As long as the focus is on providing additional coverage, such a reallocation looks like a strategem for taking something away from more
deserving victims in order to give it to less deserving victims. When,
however, the focus is on improving the time of payment for medical
and emergency expenses, there emerges a quid pro quo to the old
victims who, as a class, are compelled to accept smaller awards in order
to get quicker payments.
It might be possible to finance a plan by drawing on each of these last
two sources. The result would be a plan which, in theory, would not
alter the position of motorists, would not drive too hard a bargain with
old victims, and would not make unrealistic demands on effectuating
economies in handling claims. On this avowedly eclectic approach the
full formula for producing a plan would run as follows: 174 (1) Take no
more from motorists than in the absence of a plan. (2) Maximize the
economies in handling claims. (3) Tentatively set the award level so as
to reflect these economies through lowering the gross awards without
reducing the take-home sums. (4) Adjust the tentative award level downward so that the old victims give up enough in take-home sums to cover
any gap in satisfying the claims of new victims. 175
For a brief moment this compromise seems to realize the philosopher's
dream of a political solution which achieves the common good-a solution in which there is an adjustment of self interests in a manner that
is mutually satisfactory to each participant. On further inspection, however, the dream tends to fade. There is the doubt that, as a political
matter, the promise to the motorists can be kept; there is the doubt that
the savings through economies in handling claims will be substantial
enough to avoid a harsh bargain with the old victims; there is the high
likelihood that some old victims, either because of the certainty of their
claim at common law or because of their comfortable economic position,
will in any event find the bargain detrimental; there is the difficulty of
communicating the rationale for the compromise to a wide enough
174 For present purposes, we need not specify how damages will be allocated. Any
of the five variations discussed in section 6 supra will suffice here.
175 This may sound more complicated than it is. All it involves is combining two
sources of financing: economies and reallocating damages.
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public to enlist sufficient political support; and there is the difficulty of
translating the compromise formula into a concrete plan.
But the main challenge comes from quite another quarter. The rival
is the final alternative for financing the additional cost. It will be recalled that the last approach is not to shift losses directly but to put the
burden on all victims as a class-a class which is co-extensive with the
entire population. The image is of compulsory accident insurance for
everyone; but in reality so wide a scheme of accident insurance would
require use of the taxing mechanism to collect premiums, producing
what can be viewed as an extension of social security.
The greatest strength of this approach is that it frames the problem
candidly and coherently. From the very beginning the proponents of
plans have insisted that the auto accident be viewed as an instance of
human misfortune calling for a welfare remedy. When the situation is
looked at in this manner, it immediately becomes apparent that the
problem is bigger than that which the proponents started out to solve.
The welfare universe is not limited to victims of auto accidents but indudes victims of all other kinds of human misfortune. We can think of
no ground for singling out the misfortune of auto accident victims for
special welfare treatment.
The social security perspective also has the merits of bringing to the
surface the profound question of why the state should do anything
about human misfortunes. We infer that those who urge the state to
intervene have mixed motives. To some extent they favor sumptuary
legislation in behalf of prudence. They are willing to restrict the power
of the individual to choose because they distrust every man's capacity
to make prudent judgments about privately carrying accident insurance.
But more important, they are concerned over the financial ability of
people to absorb misfortune. They see that by no means is everyone
prosperous enough to buy adequate insurance against misfortune. The
attraction of financing protection through the tax mechanism is that
the necessary funds can be collected on some progressive tax basis, so
that the richer will pay the costs for the poorer.176 Intervention by the
state thus is sought in order to mitigate the evils of poverty. We are
tempted to hazard the grand generalization that at the root of most of
our major social issues lies the concern with what is thought to be
poverty.177 The automobile compensation plan is no exception.
While social security provides a candid and coherent approach to the
problem of the accident victim, it leaves unanswered the common law's
176

Compare section 9 supra.

177

See

BLUM

&

KALVEN, THE UNEASY

CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE

TAXATION

(1953);

compare Kalven & Rosenfield, Minow Should Watch his Step in the Wasteland,
Fortune, Oct. 1962 p. 116.
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main question of justice. In addressing itself to the problem of the
needy auto accident victim, the social security approach tells us that his
claim to help from society should be on a par with the claims of others
who suffer from misfortune. But it cannot tell us why losses caused by
negligent motorists should not be shifted to these drivers. The common
law's solution was to make negligent motorists poorer in order to compensate victims in full for their losses. The question is whether this is
any less just because the needs of victims are provided for by society.
We would urge that, in theory, the case for shifting the loss to a faulty
driver rather than leaving it with the victim or as a charge on society is
not thereby impaired. Theory would thus call for drawing a distinction
between responding immediately to the victim's needs and deciding at
leisure under the fault principle who ultimately should bear the cost.
Once the dust had settled on all payments, no one would have been
compelled to pay taxes or premiums on insurance to cover losses caused
him by the fault of another.
We may, however, be in an area where there is a wide gulf between
the theoretical and the practical. The effort to be this pure in allocating
costs according to fault presents formidable difficulties quite apart from
any controversy about the appropriateness of fault as a criterion of liability. 7

8

To implement the suggested principle fully, the welfare fund

would have to be allowed to recover over against the negligent actors.
This complication raises two awful prospects: We can anticipate that
motorists would then carry liability insurance against the threat of
subrogation by the welfare fund, and the crucial equity would lie in
adjustments between the insurance carriers and the welfare fund. And
logic would seem to require that the welfare fund also be obligated to
sue contributorily negligent victims.

79

The spectre of these two results

might well induce us to accept the social security approach without a
negligence rider.
A middle ground has been suggested. The social security approach
could be used to underwrite relief for those in need without allowing
any recovery over by the welfare fund. Victims of faulty drivers, however, would be left with their common law actions intact, subject only
to deduction for welfare payments which they have received from the
fund. Under such an arrangement, losses below a certain level would be
borne by the public generally and would be allocated wholly without
regard to fault, while losses above that level would be allocated accord178 James, Social Insurance and .Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 537 (1932); Note, The Mitigating Effect on Damages of Social
Welfare Programs,63 HAv. L. Rxv. 330 (1949).
179 As indeed is the case in EHRENZWEIG, "FULL Am" INSURANCE (1954).
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ing to the fault principle-some remaining on victims and some shifted
to drivers as the principle dictated. This result is in effect the Saskatchewan plan. For those who have a wholesale lack of enthusiasm for the
fault principle, retaining it in this context might well appear as a
foolish luxury.
So much for the perplexities of either marrying or divorcing social
security and fault.
The old common law issue of justice apart, the social security approach
to the problem of the auto accident victim has some distinctive disadvantages of its own. If economic considerations have a bearing on accident
causing behavior, this approach would seem to run the greatest risk of
lessening deterrence. Neither drivers nor pedestrians would perceive any
relationship between their taxes and their conduct in respect to automobiles. The approach also has the disadvantage of supplanting the
private insurance industry in a major sector of its activities, and replacing it with taxation and government administration of welfare benefits. Such a development would add to the power of the government and
weaken what now is an important private pool of power. Finally, the
approach calls for one more-and perhaps an irreversible-reduction in
the area of individual autonomy.
It is not comfortable for us to end by repeating all the well-aired objections to social security. We are aware that we are a long way from
home. And it is no accident that we have travelled so far from the tort
world from which we began. Private law cannot borrow goals from
public law fields without accepting the obligation to make a proper
public law analysis. In the case of automobile compensation plans, such
an analysis shows that the special problem cannot be solved adequately
without solving a larger problem. This much, at least, we have learned
from this venture in applying public law perspectives to an important
private law problem.

